in common, they wish no harm to happen to any one of the citizens and devoutly hope that all good things may fall to the lot of all of them.  If one of them himself possesses any excellence, he makes it known without hesitation, practices it enthusiastically, and exhibits it very gladly:  or, if he sees it in another, he readily advances it, is eager to increase it, and honors it most brilliantly.  On the other hand if any one deteriorates, everybody hates him.  If one meets misfortune, everybody pities him.  Each person regards the loss or shame that such cause to be a common detriment to the city.

[-5-] “This is the constitution of democracies.  Under tyrannies exactly the opposite conditions are found.  It is useless to go at length into all of the details, but the chief feature is that no one is willing to seem to know or possess anything good, because the whole ruling power generally becomes hostile to him in such a case.  Every one else takes the tyrant’s behavior as a standard of life, and pursues whatever objects he may hope to gain through him by taking advantage of his neighbor while incurring no danger himself.  Consequently the majority of the people have an eye only to their own interests and hate all other citizens:  they esteem their neighbor’s good fortune as a personal loss, and his misfortunes as a personal gain.

“Such being the state of the case, I do not see what could possibly incite you to become sole ruler.  Besides the fact that that system is disagreeable to democracies, it would be far more unpleasant still to yourself.  You surely see how the City and its affairs are even now in a state of turmoil.  It is difficult, also, to overthrow our populace which has lived during so many years in freedom, and difficult, since so many enemies confront us round about, to reduce again to slavery the allies and the subject nations, which from of old have been democratic communities and were set free by our own selves.

[-6-] “To begin first with the smallest matter, it will be requisite that you procure a large supply of money from all sides.  It is impossible that our present revenues should suffice for the very expenses, and particularly for the support of the soldiers.  This need exists also in democracies, for it is not possible to organize any government without expense.  But under such a system many give largely in addition to what is required, and do it frequently, making it a matter of rivalry and securing proper honors for their liberality.  Or, if perchance there are compulsory levies upon everybody, they endure it because they can persuade themselves that it is wise and because they are contributing in their own behalf.  Under sovereignties they think that the ruling power alone, to which they credit boundless wealth, should bear the expense:  they are very ready to search out the ruler’s sources of income, but do not make a similar careful calculation about the outgo.  They are not inclined to pay out anything extra personally