“Take precisely these same measures in the case of the knights, by enrolling in the equestrian class such as hold second place everywhere in birth, excellence, and wealth.  Register as many in both classes as may please you, not troubling at all about their numbers.  The more men of repute you have as your associates, the more easily will you yourself settle everything in case of need and persuade your subjects that you are treating them not as slaves nor in any way as inferior to us, but are sharing with them besides all the other blessings that belong to us the chief magistracy also, that so they may be devoted to it as their own possession.  I am so far from assuming this to be a mistaken policy that I say they ought all to be given a share in the government.  Thus, having an equal allotment in it, they might be faithful allies of ours, believing that they inhabited one single city owned in common by all of us, and this really a city, and regarding fields and villages as their individual property.  But about this and what ought to be done so as not to grant them absolutely everything, we shall reflect in greater detail at another time.

[-20-] “It is proper to put men on the roll of the knights at eighteen years of age; for at that period of life physical condition is at its best and suitability of temperament can be discerned.  But for the senate they should wait till they are twenty-five years old.  Is it not disgraceful and hazardous to entrust public business to men younger than this, when we will commit none of our private affairs to any one before, he has reached such an age?  After they have served as quaestors and aediles, or tribunes, let them be praetors, when they have attained their thirtieth birthday.  These offices and that of consul are the only ones at home which I maintain you ought to recognize; and that is for the sake of remembrance of ancestral customs and in order not to seem to be changing the constitution altogether.  Do you, however, yourself choose all who are to hold them and not put any of these offices longer in charge of the rabble or the populace,—­for they will surely quarrel,—­nor in charge of the senate, for its members will contend for the prize.  Moreover, do not keep up the ancient powers of these positions, for fear history may repeat itself, but preserve the honor attached while abating the influence to such an extent as will enable you to deprive each place of none of its esteem but to forestall any desire of insubordination.  This can be done if you require the incumbents to stay in town, and do not permit any of them to handle arms either during their period of office or immediately afterward, but only after the lapse of some time, as much as you think sufficient in each instance.  In this way none of them will rebel, because they become to an extent by their title masters of armies, and their irritation will be assuaged by their faring as private citizens for a time.  Let these magistrates conduct such of the festivals as would naturally belong to their office, and let them all individually try cases save those of homicide, during their tenure of office in Rome.  Courts should also be made up of the senators and knights, but the final appeal should be to the aforesaid officials.