“It demands the absolute entirety of the Commune extended to all the localities of France, ensuring to everyone the integrity of its rights, and to every Frenchman the free exercise of his faculties and abilities as man, citizen, and workman.  The rights of the Commune should have no other limit, but the equal rights of all other Communes adhering to the contract, an association which would assure the unity of France.”

This is a little obscure.  What I understand is something like this.  You would make France a federation of Communes, but what is the meaning of words “adherence to the contract?” You admit then that certain Communes might refuse their adhesion.  In that case what would be the situation of these rebels?  Would you leave them free?  Or would you force them to obey the conventions of the majority?  Do you think it would be sufficient, in the case of such a town as Pezenas, for example, refusing to adhere, that the association would be incomplete?  That is to say, that French unity would not exist?  Are you very sure about Pezenas?  Who tells you that Pezenas may not have its own idea of independence, and that, we may not hear presently that it has elected a duke who raises an army and coins money.  Duke of Pezenas! that sounds well.  Remember, also, that many other localities might follow the example of Pezenas, and perhaps in order to insure the entirety of the Commune, it might have been wise to have asked them if they wanted it.  Now, what do you understand by “localities?” Marseilles is a locality; an isolated farm in the middle of a field is also a locality.  So France would be divided into an infinite number of Communes.  Would they agree amongst themselves, these innumerable little states?  Supposing they are agreed to the contract, it is not impossible that petty rivalries should lead to quarrels, or even to blows; an action about a party-wall might lead to a civil war.  How would you reduce the recalcitrant localities to reason? for even supposing that the Communes have the right to subjugate a Commune, the disaffected one could always escape you by declaring that it no longer adheres to the social compact.  So that if this secession were produced not only by the vanity of one or more little hamlets, but by the pride of one or more great towns, France would find herself all at once deprived of her most important cities.  Ah! messieurs, this part of your programme certainly leaves something to be desired, and I recommend you to improve it, unless indeed you prefer to suppress it altogether.

“The inherent rights of the Commune are ’the vote of the Commmunal budget, the levying and the division of taxes, the direction of the local services, the organisation of the magistrature, of the police, and of education, and of the administration of the property belonging to the Commune.’”

This paragraph is cunning.  It does not seem so at first sight, but look at it closely, and you will