traced to an organic defect will not, I trust, be overlooked through a too scrupulous veneration for the work of their ancestors.  The Constitution was an experiment committed to the virtue and intelligence of the great mass of our countrymen, in whose ranks the framers of it themselves were to perform the part of patriotic observation and scrutiny, and if they have passed from the stage of existence with an increased confidence in its general adaptation to our condition we should learn from authority so high the duty of fortifying the points in it which time proves to be exposed rather than be deterred from approaching them by the suggestions of fear or the dictates of misplaced reverence.

A provision which does not secure to the people a direct choice of their Chief Magistrate, but has a tendency to defeat their will, presented to my mind such an inconsistency with the general spirit of our institutions that I was induced to suggest for your consideration the substitute which appeared to me at the same time the most likely to correct the evil and to meet the views of our constituents.  The most mature reflection since has added strength to the belief that the best interests of our country require the speedy adoption of some plan calculated to effect this end.  A contingency which sometimes places it in the power of a single member of the House of Representatives to decide an election of so high and solemn a character is unjust to the people, and becomes when it occurs a source of embarrassment to the individuals thus brought into power and a cause of distrust of the representative body.  Liable as the Confederacy is, from its great extent, to parties founded upon sectional interests, and to a corresponding multiplication of candidates for the Presidency, the tendency of the constitutional reference to the House of Representatives is to devolve the election upon that body in almost every instance, and, whatever choice may then be made among the candidates thus presented to them, to swell the influence of particular interests to a degree inconsistent with the general good.  The consequences of this feature of the Constitution appear far more threatening to the peace and integrity of the Union than any which I can conceive as likely to result from the simple legislative action of the Federal Government.

It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitution to keep as separate as possible the action of the legislative and executive branches of the Government.  To secure this object nothing is more essential than to preserve the former from all temptations of private interest, and therefore so to direct the patronage of the latter as not to permit such temptations to be offered.  Experience abundantly demonstrates that every precaution in this respect is a valuable safeguard of liberty, and one which my reflections upon the tendencies of our system incline me to think should be made still stronger.  It was for this reason that, in connection with an amendment of the