This act, it will be perceived, although it fixes the maximum of outfit, is altogether silent as to the circumstances under which outfits might be allowed; indeed, the authority to allow them at all is not expressly conveyed, but only incidentally adverted to in limiting the amount.  This limitation continued to be the only restriction upon the Executive until 1810, the act of 1790 having been kept in force till that period by five successive reenactments, in which it is either referred to by means of its title or its terms are repeated verbatim.  In 1810 an act passed wherein the phraseology which had been in use for twenty years is departed from.  Fixing the same limits precisely to the amount of salaries and outfits to ministers and charges as had been six times fixed since 1790, it differs from preceding acts by formally conveying an authority to allow an outfit to “a minister plenipotentiary or charge d’affaires on going from the United States to any foreign country;” and, in addition to this specification of the circumstances under which the outfit may be allowed, it contains one of the conditions which shall be requisite to entitle a charge or secretary to the compensation therein provided.

Upon a view of all the circumstances connected with the subject I can not permit myself to doubt that it was with reference to the practice of multiplying outfits to the same person and in the intention of prohibiting it in future that this act was passed.

It being, however, frequently deemed advantageous to transfer ministers already abroad from one court to another, or to employ those who were resident at a particular court upon special occasions elsewhere, it seems to have been considered that it was not the intention of Congress to restrain the Executive from so doing.  It was further contended that the President being left free to select for ministers citizens, whether at home or abroad, a right on the part of such ministers to the usual emoluments followed as a matter of course.  This view was sustained by the opinion of the law officer of the Government, and the act of 1810 was construed to leave the whole subject of salary and outfit where it found it under the law of 1790; that is to say, completely at the discretion of the President, without any other restriction than the maximum already fixed by that law.  This discretion has from time to time been exercised by successive Presidents; but whilst I can not but consider the restriction in this respect imposed by the act of 1810 as inexpedient, I can not feel myself justified in adopting a construction which defeats the only operation of which this part of it seems susceptible; at least, not unless Congress, after having the subject distinctly brought to their consideration, should virtually give their assent to that construction.  Whatever may be thought of the propriety of giving an outfit to secretaries of legation or others who may be considered as only