If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been repudiated with indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in our Government.

In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each other.  Leagues were formed for common defense, and before the declaration of independence we were known in our aggregate character as the United Colonies of America.  That decisive and important step was taken jointly.  We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts, and when the terms of our Confederation were reduced to form it was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed that they would collectively form one nation for the purpose of conducting some certain domestic concerns and all foreign relations.  In the instrument forming that Union is found an article which declares that “every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all questions which by that Confederation should be submitted to them.”

Under the Confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision of the Congress or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision was made to enforce these decisions.  Congress made requisitions, but they were not complied with.  The Government could not operate on individuals.  They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.

But the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed.  Under its operation we could scarcely be called a nation.  We had neither prosperity at home nor consideration abroad.  This state of things could not be endured, and our present happy Constitution was formed, but formed in vain if this fatal doctrine prevails.  It was formed for important objects that are announced in the preamble, made in the name and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates framed and whose conventions approved it.  The most important among these objects—­that which is placed first in rank, on which all the others rest—­is “to form a more perfect union.”  Now, is it possible that even if there were no express provision giving supremacy to the Constitution and laws of the United States over those of the States, can it be conceived that an instrument made for the purpose of “forming a more perfect union” than that of the Confederation could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our country as to substitute for that Confederation a form of government dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit, of a State, or of a prevailing faction in a State?  Every man of plain, unsophisticated understanding who hears the question will give such an answer as will preserve the Union.  Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated to destroy it.