The defeat of the Kashmir troops had a most disastrous effect on the issue of the attack on Kishenganj.  Reinforced in great numbers, as I have related, the enemy maintained their ground, and our men could make no impression on them, chiefly from the want of field-guns.  Major Reid, moreover, was wounded at an early stage of the action, and was carried off the field.  His absence was soon felt in the altered dispositions of the force, and the want of a leader to carry out the plans formed by him.

The breastworks which had been taken could not be held for want of support, and some confusion resulted, the enemy’s artillery from Kishenganj and musketry from the gardens causing great destruction.  Many gallant attempts were made to drive off the rebels, but all were unavailing; and at length, after losing one-third of its number, the column fell back in good order to its original starting-point near the Sabzi Mandi, and Kishenganj remained in the hands of the enemy.  Had that position been taken, and No. 4 Column, according to instructions, pushed on to the Lahore Gate, no good, as it turned out, would have been effected.  Nicholson’s columns, as related, had been forced to retire; the gate would have remained closed, and possibly the undertaking would have resulted in a more serious collapse than the ineffectual attempt on Kishenganj.

The presence of a large unconquered force on our right flank also placed the camp in imminent danger.  It was known—­from information received from spies—­that it was the enemy’s intention, after our failure to dislodge them from the suburb, to make an attack on the almost unprotected camp.  The danger fortunately passed off, the rebels probably having little heart to join in operations to our rear when they heard the news of the signal success of our columns in the city.  Still, their presence at Kishenganj was a standing menace; nor were we completely at ease with regard to the safety of the camp till the 20th, when the city was found to be evacuated by the enemy, and our troops immediately took possession.

Lastly, I must narrate the doings of the Cavalry Brigade.  This force, with Horse Artillery, was stationed near No. 1 Advanced Battery, under the command of Brigadier Hope-Grant, their duty being to guard our right flank from being turned during the assault on the city.  Here they remained, keeping a watchful lookout for some hours, till orders came for the brigade to move towards the walls of Delhi.  They halted opposite the Kabul Gate, at a distance of 400 yards, and were at once exposed to the fire from the bastions, and to musketry from the gardens outside the suburbs of Taliwarra and Kishenganj.  Our Horse Artillery made good practice, driving the enemy from their cover and spiking two guns; but the exposed situation caused great losses in the cavalry, and they moved still further to their front, halting amidst some trees.

The enemy now sallied from the gardens as though with the intention of driving the cavalry in the direction of the Kashmir Gate.  The circumstances were most critical, when a body of Guide Infantry, coming up at the time, threw themselves on the rebels, maintaining their place with great resolution till help arrived, with a part of the Belooch battalion, and the enemy were forced to retire.