In their scientific objections the two reviewers take somewhat different lines; but their philosophical and theological arguments strikingly coincide.  They agree in emphatically asserting that Darwin’s hypothesis of the origination of species through variation and natural selection “repudiates the whole doctrine of final causes,” and “all indication of design or purpose in the organic world,”—­“is neither more nor less than a formal denial of any agency beyond that of a blind chance in the developing or perfecting of the organs or instincts of created beings.”  “It is in vain that the apologists of this hypothesis might say that it merely attributes a different mode and time to the Divine agency,—­that all the qualities subsequently appearing in their descendants must have been implanted, and remained latent in the original pair.”  Such a view, the Examiner declares, “is nowhere stated in this book, and would be, we are sure, disclaimed by the author.”  We should like to be informed of the grounds of this sureness.  The marked rejection of spontaneous generation,—­the statement of a belief that all animals have descended from four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number, or, perhaps, if constrained to it by analogy, “from some one primordial form into which life was first breathed.”—­coupled with the expression, “To my mind it accords better with what we know of the laws impressed on matter by the Creator, that the production and extinction of the past and present inhabitants of the world should have been due to secondary causes,” than “that each species has been independently created,”—­those and similar expressions lead us to suppose that the author probably does accept the kind of view which the “Examiner” is sure he would disclaim.  At least, we see nothing in his scientific theory to hinder his adoption of Lord Bacon’s Confession of Faith in this regard,—­“that, notwithstanding God hath rested and ceased from creating, [in the sense of supernatural origination,] yet, nevertheless, He doth accomplish and fulfil His divine will in all things, great and small, singular and general, as fully and exactly by providence as He could by miracle and new creation, though His working be not immediate and direct, but by compass; not violating Nature, which is His own law upon the creature.”

However that may be, it is undeniable that Mr. Darwin has purposely been silent upon the philosophical and theological applications of his theory.  This reticence, under the circumstances, argues design, and raises inquiry as to the final cause or reason why.  Here, as in higher instances, confident as we are that there is a final cause, we must not be overconfident that we can infer the particular or true one.  Perhaps the author is more familiar with natural-historical than with philosophical inquiries, and, not having decided which particular theory about efficient cause is best founded, he meanwhile argues the scientific questions concerned—­all that relates to secondary causes—­upon purely scientific grounds, as he must do in any case.  Perhaps, confident, as he evidently is, that his view will finally be adopted, he may enjoy a sort of satisfaction in hearing it denounced as sheer atheism by the inconsiderate, and afterwards, when it takes its place with the nebular hypothesis and the like, see this judgment reversed, as we suppose it would be in such event.