It must not be forgotten that on former occasions very confident judgments have been pronounced by very competent persons, which have not been finally ratified.  Of the two great minds of the seventeenth century, Newton and Leibnitz, both profoundly religious as well as philosophical, one produced the theory of gravitation, the other objected to that theory that it was subversive of natural religion.  The nebular hypothesis—­a natural consequence of the theory of gravitation and of the subsequent progress of physical and astronomical discovery—­has been denounced as atheistical even down to our own day.  But it is now largely adopted by the most theistical natural philosophers as a tenable and perhaps sufficient hypothesis, and where not accepted is no longer objected to, so far as we know, on philosophical or religious grounds.

The gist of the philosophical objections urged by the two Boston reviewers against an hypothesis of the derivation of species—­or at least against Darwin’s particular hypothesis—­is, that it is incompatible with the idea of any manifestation of design in the universe, that it denies final causes.  A serious objection this, and one that demands very serious attention.

The proposition, that things and events in Nature were not designed to be so, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism.  Yet most people believe that some were designed and others were not, although they fall into a hopeless maze whenever they undertake to define their position.  So we should not like to stigmatize as atheistically disposed a person who regards certain things and events as being what they are through designed laws, (whatever that expression means,) but as not themselves specially ordained, or who, in another connection, believes in general, but not in particular Providence.  We could sadly puzzle him with questions; but in return he might equally puzzle us.  Then, to deny that anything was specially designed to be what it is is one proposition; while to deny that the Designer supernaturally or immediately made it so is another:  though the reviewers appear not to recognize the distinction.

Also, “scornfully to repudiate” or to “sneer at the idea of any manifestation of design in the material universe"[2] is one thing; while to consider, and perhaps to exaggerate, the difficulties which attend the practical application of the doctrine of final causes to certain instances is quite another thing:  yet the Boston reviewers, we regret to say, have not been duly regardful of the difference.  Whatever be thought of Darwin’s doctrine, we are surprised that he should be charged with scorning or sneering at the opinions of others, upon such a subject.  Perhaps Darwin’s view is incompatible with final causes;—­we will consider that question presently;—­but as to the “Examiner’s” charge, that he “sneers at the idea of any manifestation of design in the material universe,” though we are confident that no misrepresentation was intended, we are equally confident that it is not at all warranted by the two passages cited in support of it.  Here are the passages:—­