This circumstance explains why it is that, every thirty years or so, science, literature, and art, as expressed in the spirit of the time, are declared bankrupt.  The errors which appear from time to time amount to such a height in that period that the mere weight of their absurdity makes the fabric fall; whilst the opposition to them has been gathering force at the same time.  So an upset takes place, often followed by an error in the opposite direction.  To exhibit these movements in their periodical return would be the true practical aim of the history of literature:  little attention, however, is paid to it.  And besides, the comparatively short duration of these periods makes it difficult to collect the data of epochs long gone by, so that it is most convenient to observe how the matter stands in one’s own generation.  An instance of this tendency, drawn from physical science, is supplied in the Neptunian geology of Werter.

But let me keep strictly to the example cited above, the nearest we can take.  In German philosophy, the brilliant epoch of Kant was immediately followed by a period which aimed rather at being imposing than at convincing.  Instead of being thorough and clear, it tried to be dazzling, hyperbolical, and, in a special degree, unintelligible:  instead of seeking truth, it intrigued.  Philosophy could make no progress in this fashion; and at last the whole school and its method became bankrupt.  For the effrontery of Hegel and his fellows came to such a pass,—­whether because they talked such sophisticated nonsense, or were so unscrupulously puffed, or because the entire aim of this pretty piece of work was quite obvious,—­that in the end there was nothing to prevent charlatanry of the whole business from becoming manifest to everybody:  and when, in consequence of certain disclosures, the favor it had enjoyed in high quarters was withdrawn, the system was openly ridiculed.  This most miserable of all the meagre philosophies that have ever existed came to grief, and dragged down with it into the abysm of discredit, the systems of Fichte and Schelling which had preceded it.  And so, as far as Germany is concerned, the total philosophical incompetence of the first half of the century following upon Kant is quite plain:  and still the Germans boast of their talent for philosophy in comparison with foreigners, especially since an English writer has been so maliciously ironical as to call them “a nation of thinkers.”

For an example of the general system of epicycles drawn from the history of art, look at the school of sculpture which flourished in the last century and took its name from Bernini, more especially at the development of it which prevailed in France.  The ideal of this school was not antique beauty, but commonplace nature:  instead of the simplicity and grace of ancient art, it represented the manners of a French minuet.