beneficial to the state; and by the aid of four tribunes against one obstructor of the public good, the consuls carried out the levy.  They then set out to the war against Veii, to which auxiliaries had assembled from all parts of Etruria, not so much influenced by feelings of regard for the Veientines, as because they had formed a hope that the power of Rome could be destroyed by internal discord.  And in the general councils of all the states of Etruria the leading men murmured that the power of Rome would last forever, unless they were distracted by disturbances among themselves:  that this was the only poison, this the bane discovered for powerful states, to render mighty empires mortal:  that this evil, a long time checked, partly by the wise measures of the patricians, partly by the forbearance of the commons, had now proceeded to extremities:  that two states were now formed out of one:  that each party had its own magistrates, its own laws:  that, although at first they were accustomed to be turbulent during the levies, still these same individuals had notwithstanding ever been obedient to their commanders during war:  that as long as military discipline was retained, no matter what might be the state of the city, the evil might have been withstood:  but that now the custom of not obeying their officers followed the Roman soldier even to the camp:  that in the last war, even in a regular engagement and in the very heat of battle, by consent of the army the victory had been voluntarily surrendered to the vanquished Aequans:  that the standards had been deserted, the general abandoned on the field, and that the army had returned to camp without orders:  without doubt, if they persevered, Rome might be conquered by means of her own soldiery:  nothing else was necessary save a declaration and show of war:  the fates and the gods would of themselves manage the rest.  These hopes had armed the Etruscans, who by many changes of fortune had been vanquished and victors in turn.

The Roman consuls also dreaded nothing else but their own strength and their own arms.  The recollection of the most mischievous precedent set in the last war was a terrible warning to them not to let matters go so far that they would have two armies to fear at the same time.  Accordingly, they kept within their camp, avoiding battle, owing to the two-fold danger that threatened them, thinking that length of time and circumstances themselves would perchance soften down resentment, and bring them to a healthy frame of mind.  The Veientine enemy and the Etruscans proceeded with proportionately greater precipitation; they provoked them to battle, at first by riding up to the camp and challenging them; at length when they produced no effect, by reviling the consuls and the army alike, they declared that the pretence of internal dissension was assumed as a cloak for cowardice:  and that the consuls rather distrusted the courage than disbelieved the sincerity of their soldiers: