CHAPTER

I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of Rome

II.  Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged

III.  Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect

IV.  That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful

V. Whether the guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions

VI.  Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate

VII.  That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse

VIII.  That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful

IX.  That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man

X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame

XI.  Of the Religion of the Romans

XII.  That it is of much moment to make account of Religion; and that
Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined

XIII.  Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults

XIV.  That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished

XV.  How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse to Religion

XVI.  That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom

XVII.  That a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it

XVIII.  How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created

XIX.  After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself:  but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second

XX.  That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results:  and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended

XXI.  That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army

XXII.  What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii

XXIII.  That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful