’this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given
    to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at
    Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave’.[149]

The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France.  On July 31st Sir Edward Grey said:—­

    ’I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
    decisive factor in situation.  German Government do not expect our
    neutrality.’[150]

It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey’s belief was justified.  England’s attitude may have been an important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due observance of constitutional usages, have taken any other course.  Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality.  The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs later affected great surprise at our action.  Germany, however, as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral under all circumstances.

Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany’s prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent.  And unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play.  The near East was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly—­and even probably[152] with Germany’s knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.

It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] ’the dossier elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of 28th June’, which it said it held at the disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff ’admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory’.[155]

To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd.  But even assuming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.