Great Britain declines ‘Solidarity’ with Russia and France.

There is however another question which involves the whole foreign policy of Great Britain.  Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force?  It was a policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been successful.  It is to Sir Edward Grey’s credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step.  Let us examine these proposals briefly.  As early as July 24th M. Sazonof ’hoped that His Majesty’s Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[142]’ The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that

    ’we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out;
    we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the
    outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].’

On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that

’peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain.  If His Majesty’s Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her attitude[144].’

Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:—­

    ’As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
    she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he
    thought it would have a great effect.’[145]

Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and the British Ambassadors were equally firm in withstanding them.  Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he

    ’saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His
    Majesty’s Government that would entail an unconditional engagement
    on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms’.[146]

On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present attitude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon that

’even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it.  It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—­a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question’.[148]

That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on Britain’s foreign policy in past years.  Sir Edward Grey had another answer.  It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality.  For when the Russian Ambassador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that