We must now turn our eyes to the West of Europe, and observe the diplomacy of Germany with regard to France and Great Britain.  On the 27th of July we are told that the German Government received ’the first intimation concerning the preparatory measures taken by France:  the 14th Corps discontinued the manoeuvres and returned to its garrison’.[98] Will it be believed that, except for the assertion ’of rapidly progressing preparations of France, both on water and on land’,[99] this is the only shred of evidence that the Germans have produced to prove the aggressive intentions of France?  And it may be worth while to point out that on July 29, when the German White Book says that Berlin heard of the ‘rapidly progressing preparations of France’, the French Ambassador at Berlin informed the Secretary of State that ’they had done nothing more than the German Government had done, namely, recalled the officers on leave’.[100]

The very next day the French Government had ’reliable information that the German troops are concentrated round Thionville and Metz ready for war’,[101] and before July 30th German patrols twice penetrated into French territory.[102] With great forbearance the French Government withdrew its troops ten kilometres from the frontier; and, although German reservists had been recalled from abroad ‘by tens of thousands’, the French Government had not called out a single reservist.  Well might the French Minister for Foreign Affairs say ’Germany has done it’.[103]

Having thus invaded France before July 30th, the German Government presented an ultimatum (July 31) demanding what were the French intentions, and on August 1st the French Government replied that it would consult its own interests.[104]

III

The Question of British Neutrality.

Even then, nothing had happened to bring this country into the quarrel.  If Germany were making war primarily on Russia, and France were only involved as the auxiliary of Russia, Germany would have acted rapidly against Russia, and would have stood on the defensive against France; and England would not have been dragged into war.[105] The question of British neutrality first appears in the British White Book on July 25th, when Sir Edward Grey, in a note to Sir George Buchanan, said:  ’if war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it’.[106] Two days later he wrote again:—­

’I have been told by the Russian Ambassador that in German and Austrian circles impression prevails that in any event we would stand aside ...  This impression ought, as I have pointed out, to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet ... not to disperse for manoeuvre leave.  But ... my reference to it must not be taken to mean that anything more than diplomatic action was promised.’[107]

On the 29th the question of our neutrality was seriously discussed at both the Courts of St. James and Berlin independently.  Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with Prince Lichnowsky, told him ’he did not wish the Ambassador to be misled ... into thinking we should stand aside’.  Developing this, Sir Edward Grey solemnly warned the German Ambassador that