Thus on Friday, July 31st, the situation had come to be this, that Russia, feeling herself threatened by the military preparations of Austria and Germany, decided to issue orders for a general mobilization.[90] Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey still clung to the hope that mediation with a view to safeguarding Austrian interests as against Servia might yet be accepted.[91] But his efforts were useless, for Germany had launched an ultimatum (July 31) to Russia, demanding demobilization.  As Sir Edward Goschen pointed out, the demand was made ’even more difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in the south as well’.[92] The only explanation actually vouchsafed was that this had been asked to prevent Russia pleading that all her mobilization was only directed against Austria.  Such a quibble, when such interests are at stake, seems to call for severe comment.

War between the three empires seemed now inevitable, for though the Emperor of Russia and the German Emperor had exchanged telegrams each imploring the other to find a way out of the difficulty, and each saying that matters had gone so far that neither could grant the other’s demands,[93] the officials at Berlin were now taking up the position that ’Russia’s mobilization had spoilt everything’.[94] This attitude is as inexplicable as it proved disastrous.  For it appears that on July 31 Austria and Russia were ready to resume conversations.  The Austrians, apparently alarmed at the prospect of a general war, were ready to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia, and Russia announced that under certain conditions ’she would undertake to preserve her waiting attitude’.[95] Having issued her ultimatum to Russia, Germany naturally mobilized, but what kind of diplomacy is this in which, with the principals both ready to negotiate, a third party issues an ultimatum couched in such terms that a proud country can give but one answer?

The sequence of events seems to be as follows.  Austria mobilized against Servia.  Russia, rightly or wrongly, took this as a threat to herself, and mobilized all her southern forces against Austria.  Then Germany threatened to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations—­an inexcusable step, which increased Russia’s apprehensions of a general war, and made a general Russian mobilization inevitable.[96] If Russia was the first to mobilize, she took this step in consequence of German threats.  We repeat that in spite of the three empires taking this action, discussion was still possible between Russia and Austria,[97] and might have had good results.  In fact, the situation was not irretrievable, if Germany had not rendered it so by issuing her ultimatum to Russia.  Once again we may ask, was this crime or folly?

II

Germany’s attitude to France.