There was therefore, according to the evidence produced by the Germans themselves, no mobilization ‘against Germany’.  The only thing that looks at all like hostile action is contained in the news sent by the Imperial German Consul at Kovno on July 27th, that a ‘state of war’ (Kriegszustand) had been proclaimed in that district.  But this is a very different thing from mobilization; it was almost bound to follow in the northern provinces of the Empire as the result of mobilization elsewhere.  At any rate the Consul at Kovno announced it on July 27th before any Russian mobilization at all had taken place, and the fact that Germany did not instantly mobilize shows that at the end of July that Government did not consider Kriegszustand in Kovno to be equivalent to ‘mobilization against Germany’.

Opinion in Berlin seems to have been that Russia would not make war.  Perhaps there was no real fear that Russia would take an aggressive attitude, for many people believed that ’Russia neither wanted, nor was in a position to make war’.[82] This attitude of mind was known and deplored in Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano said ’there seemed to be a difficulty in making Germany believe that Russia was in earnest’.[83] Such an opinion seems to have been shared by Count Pourtales, who on July 29 reported that the German Government were willing to guarantee that Servian integrity would be respected by Austria.  This was held to be insufficient, as Servia might thus become an Austrian vassal, and there would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.  The next day the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the British and French Ambassadors ’that absolute proof was in the possession of the Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval preparations against Russia—­more particularly in the direction of the Gulf of Finland’.[84]

After this, is it difficult to see how German statesmen regarded the situation?  Russia, in their eyes, was playing a game of bluff, and strong measures against her were in the interest of Germany.  But, though under no illusion as to German preparations, M. Sazonof offered on July 30 to stop all military preparations if Austria ’would eliminate from her ultimatum to Servia points which violate the principle of the sovereignty of Servia’.[85] ’Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if this proposal is rejected by Austria,’ wrote Sir George Buchanan.[86] The next day he reported to Sir Edward Grey that all attempts to obtain the consent of Austria to mediation had failed, and that she was moving troops against Russia as well as against Servia.[87]

Face to face therefore with war against another Power, Russia ordered a general mobilization.[88] This was answered on the same day by a proclamation of Kriegsgefahr at Berlin, ’as it can only be against Germany that Russian general mobilization is directed’.[89]