The proposed conference having been rejected by Germany, an attempt was then made by several Powers to invite Austria to suspend military action.  Although Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, had made on July 25th a distinction between military preparations and military operations, and had urged that his Government had only the former then in view, it was reported two days later from Rome that there were great doubts ’whether Germany would be willing to invite Austria to suspend military action pending the conference’.  Even if she had been willing to do so, it is very doubtful whether, in view of the Austrian declaration of war against Servia on July 28th, and the simultaneous Austrian decree for general mobilization, the position of Europe could have been improved, for on July 29th that declaration was followed by news of the Russian mobilization of the southern districts of Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan.[77]

Now the German Secretary of State had argued that ’if Russia mobilized against Germany, latter would have to follow suit’.  On being asked what he meant by ‘mobilizing against Germany’, he said that

’if Russia mobilized in the South, Germany would not mobilize, but if she mobilized in the north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization.  Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.’[78]

This was on July 27th, and it cannot be said to have been unreasonable.  But when on July 29th Russia mobilized the southern districts no grounds for German mobilization had yet been provided.  No secret was made about this mobilization by the Russian Ambassador at Berlin,[79] but it is perhaps as well to point out here the remark made by Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, about the language used by his German colleague concerning the mobilization of the four southern districts:  ’He accused the Russian Government of endangering the peace of Europe by their mobilization, and said, when I referred to all that had recently been done by Austria, that he could not discuss such matters.’[80] It would perhaps be rash to assume that the German Ambassador, Count Pourtales, used such language to his home Government, for there is no evidence of it in the German White Book.  What dispatches appear there from the German Embassy at St. Petersburg are refreshingly honest.  The military attache says, ’I deem it certain that mobilization has been ordered for Kiev and Odessa’.  He adds:  ’it is doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow, and improbable elsewhere’.[81]