’The whole idea of mediation or mediating influence was ready to be
    put into operation by any method that Germany could suggest if mine
    was not acceptable.’[71]

But owing to German dilatoriness in this matter, events had by then gone so far that the very gravest questions had arisen for this country.

With the refusal of the German Government to propose a form of mediation acceptable to themselves before graver events had occurred, the first period of the negotiation comes to an end.  The responsibility of rejecting a conference, which, by staving off the evil day, might have preserved the peace of Europe, falls solely on the shoulders of Germany.  The reasons advanced by Herr von Jagow were erroneous, and though Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the Imperial Chancellor, was more conciliatory and sympathetic, it may be noted that the German White Book[72] continues to misrepresent Sir Edward Grey’s proposal as a conference on the particular question of the Austro-Servian dispute, and not on the general situation of Europe.

In the period that follows come spasmodic attempts at negotiation by direct conversations between the parties concerned, with no advantage, but rather with the growth of mutual suspicion.  Down to August 1st both Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof were busy trying to find some formula which might be accepted as a basis for postponing hostilities between the Great Powers.  And here it may be well to point out that Prince Lichnowsky seems to have been left in the dark by his chiefs.  On July 24th, the day after the Austrian note was presented, he was so little acquainted with the true state of affairs, that speaking privately he told Sir Edward Grey ’that a reply favourable on some points must be sent at once by Servia, so that an excuse against immediate action might be afforded to Austria’.[73] And in the matter of the conference, on the very day that Herr von Jagow was making his excuses against entering the proposed conference, Prince Lichnowsky informed Sir Edward Grey, that the German Government accepted in principle mediation between Austria and Russia by the four Powers, reserving, of course, their right as an ally to help Austria if attacked.[74] The mutual incompatibility of the two voices of Germany was pointed out from Rome, where the Marquis di San Giuliano, the Italian Foreign Minister, attempted a reconciliation between them, on information received from Berlin, that ’the difficulty was rather the “conference” than the principle’.[75] But we may ask whether Herr von Jagow’s reply to Sir Edward Goschen does not really show that the whole principle of a conference was objected to, seeing that he said that such a ‘conference was not practicable’, and that ’it would be best to await the outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments’.[76] But, if it was not the principle that was objected to, but only the form, where are we?  We can do nothing else but assume that the German Government objected to the terms employed by Sir Edward Grey, and that for the sake of a mere quibble they wasted time until other events made the catastrophe inevitable.  Impartiality will have to judge whether such action was deliberate or not; whether in this case also it is crime or folly which has to be laid at the door of the German Government.