listen.  As late as July 28th the German Chancellor himself refused ’to discuss the Servian note’, adding that ’Austria’s standpoint, and in this he agreed, was that her quarrel with Servia was a purely Austrian concern with which Russia had nothing to do’.[65] Next day the German Ambassador at Vienna was continuing ’to feign surprise that Servian affairs could be of such interest to Russia’.[66] But in their White Book, in order to blacken the character of Russia, the Germans remark that they ’were perfectly aware that a possible warlike attitude of Austria-Hungary against Servia might bring Russia into the field’.[67] Both stories cannot be true:  the German Government have, not for the last time in the history of these negotiations, to choose between ineptitude and guilt; the ineptitude of not recognizing an obvious fact, and the guilt of deliberately allowing Austria to act in such a way that Russia was bound to come into the field.

When Austria presented her ultimatum, Sir Edward Grey did all he could to obtain the good offices of Russia for a conciliatory reply by Servia, and to persuade the German Government to use influence with Austria so that she should take a friendly attitude to Servia.  On the day of the presentation of the Austrian note he proposed to Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, the co-operation of the four Powers, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain, in favour of moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg, and when the Austrians rejected the Servian reply he took the important step of proposing that the French, Italian, and German Ambassadors should meet him in conference immediately ’for the purpose of discovering an issue which would prevent complications’.[68] The proposal was accepted with alacrity by the French and Italian Governments.  The German Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Jagow, on the other hand, was unable or unwilling to understand the proposal, and Sir Edward Goschen seems to have been unable to impress its real character upon the Government of Berlin.  For Herr von Jagow, on receipt of the proposal, informed the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, that the conference suggested

    ’would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not in
    his opinion be called together except at the request of Austria and
    Russia.  He could not therefore fall in with it.’

Sir Edward Goschen not unnaturally pointed out that

    ’the idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that
    representatives of the four nations not directly interested should
    discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation’.[69]

Herr von Jagow spoke in the same sense to the French and Italian Ambassadors, who discussed the matter with their British colleague.  Some doubt seems to have arisen in their minds as to the sincerity of the German Secretary of State’s loudly expressed desire for peace; but, giving him the benefit of the doubt, they concluded that the objection must be to the ‘form of the proposal’.  ‘Perhaps’, added Sir Edward Goschen, ’he himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find it possible to work with us.’[70] The next day the same idea was pressed by Sir Edward Grey upon Prince Lichnowsky:—­