At Vienna Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, was very frankly told by the German Ambassador that Germany was shielding Austria in the Servian business:—­

’As for Germany, she knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter....  Servian concessions were all a sham.  Servia proved that she well knew that they were insufficient to satisfy the legitimate demands of Austria-Hungary by the fact that before making her offer she had ordered mobilization and retirement of Government from Belgrade.’[61]

M. Sazonof, the Russian Foreign Minister, seems to have divined this policy of Germany pretty soon:—­

’My interviews with the German Ambassador confirm my impression that Germany is, if anything, in favour of the uncompromising attitude adopted by Austria.  The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this crisis developing, appear to be exercising no influence upon their ally....  There is no doubt that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin.’[62]

When at the beginning of August the crisis had led to war, it is interesting to observe the opinions expressed by high and well-informed officials about German diplomacy.  M. Sazonof summed up his opinion thus:—­

’The policy of Austria had throughout been tortuous and immoral, and she thought she could treat Russia with defiance, secure in the support of her German ally.  Similarly the policy of Germany had been an equivocal and double-faced policy, and it mattered little whether the German Government knew or did not know the terms of the Austrian ultimatum; what mattered was that her intervention with the Austrian Government had been postponed until the moment had passed when its influence would have been felt.  Germany was unfortunate in her representatives in Vienna and St. Petersburg; the former was a violent Russophobe who had urged Austria on, the latter had reported to his Government that Russia would never go to war.’[63]

And Sir Maurice de Bunsen on the same day wrote that he agreed with his Russian colleague that

’the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from the first, and his strong personal bias probably coloured his action here.  The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German Government also desired war from the first.’[64]

Sir Maurice does not actually endorse this opinion concerning the attitude of the German Government, but there can be no doubt that this general attitude was most pernicious to the cause of European peace, and that if the German Government had desired war they could scarcely have acted more efficiently towards that end.  No diplomatic pressure was put upon Vienna, which under the aegis of Berlin was allowed to go to any lengths against Servia.  Over and over again the German diplomats were told that Russia was deeply interested in Servia, but they would not