RUSSIA:  Emperor Nicholas II, succ. 1894.
Foreign Secretary:  M. Sazonof.
Ambassadors from Great Britain:  Sir George Buchanan.
  France:  M. Paleologue.
  Germany:  Count Pourtales.
  Austria:  Friedrich Count Szapary.

FRANCE:  Raymond Poincare, President, elected 1913.
Premier:  M. Viviani.
Acting Foreign Secretary:  M. Doumergue.
Ambassadors from Great Britain:  Sir Francis Bertie.
  Russia:  M. Isvolsky. 
    M. Sevastopoulo (Charge d’Affaires).
  Germany:  Baron von Schoen.
  Austria:  Count Scezsen.

GERMANY:  Emperor William II, succ. 1888.
Imperial Chancellor:  Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Foreign Secretary:  Herr von Jagow.
Ambassadors from Great Britain:  Sir Edward Goschen. 
    Sir Horace Rumbold (Councillor).
  Russia: M. Swerbeiev. 
    M. Bronewsky (Charge d’Affaires).
  France: M. Jules Cambon.
  Austria:  Count Ladislaus Szoegyeny-Marich.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY:  Emperor Francis Joseph, succ. 1848.
Foreign Secretary:  Count Berchtold.
Ambassadors from Great Britain:  Sir Maurice de Bunsen.
  Russia:  M. Schebesco. 
    M. Kondachev (Charge d’Affaires).
  France:  M. Crozier.
  Germany:  Herr von Tschirscky-und-Boegendorff.

ITALY:  King Victor Emmanuel III, succ. 1900. Foreign Secretary:  Marquis di San Giuliano. Ambassador from Great Britain:  Sir Rennell Rodd.

BELGIUM:  King Albert, succ. 1909.
Minister of Great Britain:  Sir Francis Villiers.

SERVIA:  King Peter, succ. 1903.
Minister of Great Britain:  C.L. des Graz. 
  D.M.  Crackanthorpe (First Secretary).
Russian Charge d’Affaires:  M. Strandtmann.

I

Germany’s attitude to Austria and Russia.

From the very beginning of the conversations between the Powers on the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Serajevo, and on the Austrian note to Servia, the German Government took up the attitude that it was a ’matter for settlement between Servia and Austria alone.’[57] Subsequently in their White Book they endeavoured to show that the Servian agitation was part of Russian propagandism.[58] In the negotiations, the cardinal point of their observations is that Russia is not to interfere in this matter, although M. Paul Cambon pointed out that ’Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia’.[59]

After the presentation of the Austrian note to Servia, Germany continued to maintain the position that the crisis could be localized, and to reject Sir Horace Rumbold’s suggestion that ’in taking military action in Servia, Austria would dangerously excite public opinion in Russia’.[60]