In 1911 followed the episode of Agadir, which was clearly an attempt to ‘force a quarrel on France.’  But in 1911 Germany realized that her military calculations had been insufficient, if she wished to continue these unamiable diplomatic manners.  It was not a question of self-preservation; it was a question, as the German Chancellor told the Reichstag, of showing the world that ’Germany was firmly resolved not to be pushed aside.’  Hence the sensational Army Bill of 1912, necessitated, as the Government told the Reichstag, by the events of 1911.  The Russian peril could hardly be described as imminent.  The Prussian Minister of War said publicly in 1911 that ’there was no Government which either desired or was seeking to bring about a war with Germany.’  Russia had recently taken steps which, at Berlin, perhaps, were read as signs of weakness, but elsewhere were hailed as proofs of her desire for general peace.  M. Isvolsky, the supposed champion of Balkan ideals, had retired from office; his successor, M. Sazonof, had accompanied the Czar to the Potsdam interview (1910); the outstanding disputes of Germany and Russia over their Persian interests had been settled by agreement in 1911.

But the German Army Bill of 1912 was followed by Russia’s intervention in the Balkans to secure for Servia at least commercial access to the Adriatic.  This compromise, ostensibly promoted and belauded by German statesmanship, only increased the determination of the German Government to ‘hold the ring’ in the Balkans, to claim for Austria the right of settling her own differences with Servia as she would, and to deny Russia any interest in the matter.  In 1913 came the supreme effort of the German General Staff:  an Army Act for raising the peace strength by instalments until it reached 870,000, and for the eventual provision of a war strength of 5,400,000 men.  This enormous increase was recommended ‘by the unanimous judgement of the military authorities’ as being ‘necessary to secure the future of Germany.’  The Chancellor warned the Reichstag that, although relations were friendly with Russia, they had to face the possibilities involved in the Pan-Slavist movement; while in Russia itself they had to reckon with a marvellous economic development and an unprecedented reorganization of the army.  There was also a reference to the new law for a return to three years’ service which France was introducing to improve the efficiency of her peace establishment.  But it was obvious that Russia was the main preoccupation.  Germany had forced the pace both in the aggrandizement of her military strength and in the methods of her diplomatic intercourse.  Suddenly she found herself on the brink of an abyss.  She had gone too far; she had provoked into the competition of armaments a Power as far superior to Germany in her reserves of men as Germany thought herself superior to France.  It was not too late for Germany to pause.  On her future behaviour towards other Powers it depended whether the Bill of 1913 should be taken as an insurance against risks, or as a challenge to all possible opponents.