Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Of the part which England played in the Moroccan dispute there are different versions.  What is certain is that she gave France her diplomatic support.  But the German Chancellor officially acknowledged, when all was over, that England’s share in the Anglo-French Agreement had been perfectly correct, and that Germany bore England no ill-will for effecting a rapprochement with France.  Still there remained a strong impression, not only in England and France, that there had been on Germany’s part a deliberate intention to test the strength of the Anglo-French understanding and, if possible, to show France that England was a broken reed.

It is not surprising that under these circumstances England has taken, since 1906, the precaution of freeing herself from any embarrassments in which she had previously been involved with other Powers.  In 1905 she had shown her goodwill to Russia by exercising her influence to moderate the terms of the settlement with Japan.  This was a wise step, consonant alike with English treaty-obligations to Japan and with the interests of European civilization.  It led naturally to an amicable agreement with Russia (1907) concerning Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet, the three countries which touch the northern borders of our Indian Empire.  It cannot be too strongly emphasized that this agreement was of a local character, exactly as was that with France; that our friendly understandings with France and with Russia were entirely separate; and that neither related to the prosecution of a common policy in Europe; unless indeed the name of a policy could be given to the precaution, which was from time to time adopted, of permitting consultations between the French and English military experts.  It was understood that these consultations committed neither country to a policy of common action.[14] England was drifting from her old attitude of ’splendid isolation’; but she had as yet no desire to involve herself, even for defensive purposes, in such a formal and permanent alliance as that which had been contracted by Germany, Austria, and Italy.

But her hand was forced by Germany in 1911.  Again the question of Morocco was made to supply a pretext for attacking our friendship with France.  The German occupation of Agadir had, and could have, only one meaning.  It was ’fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us’.[15] The attack failed in its object.  War was averted by the prompt action of the British Government.  Mr. Asquith[16] announced that Great Britain, in discussing the Moroccan question, would have regard to British interests, which might be more directly involved than had hitherto been the case, and also to our treaty obligations with France.  Somewhat later Mr. Asquith announced that if the negotiations between France and Germany did not reach a satisfactory settlement, Great Britain would become an active party to the discussion.[17]

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.