itself in her path, or that questions of mere policy or prestige should be regarded anywhere as superseding the necessity which had arisen to exact summary vengeance for the crime of Serajevo.  The conviction had been expressed to me by the German Ambassador on the 24th July that Russia would stand aside.  This feeling, which was also held at the Ballplatz, influenced no doubt the course of events, and it is deplorable that no effort should have been made to secure by means of diplomatic negotiations the acquiescence of Russia and Europe as a whole in some peaceful compromise of the Servian question by which Austrian fears of Servian aggression and intrigue might have been removed for the future.  Instead of adopting this course the Austro-Hungarian Government resolved upon war.  The inevitable consequence ensued.  Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war against Servia by a partial Russian mobilisation against Austria.  Austria met this move by completing her own mobilisation, and Russia again responded with results which have passed into history.  The fate of the proposals put forward by His Majesty’s Government for the preservation of peace is recorded in the White Paper on the European Crisis[191].  On the 28th July I saw Count Berchtold and urged as strongly as I could that the scheme of mediation mentioned in your speech in the House of Commons on the previous day should be accepted as offering an honourable and peaceful settlement of the question at issue.  His Excellency himself read to me a telegraphic report of the speech, but added that matters had gone too far; Austria was that day declaring war on Servia, and she could never accept the conference which you had suggested should take place between the less interested Powers on the basis of the Servian reply.  This was a matter which must be settled directly between the two parties immediately concerned.  I said His Majesty’s Government would hear with regret that hostilities could not be arrested, as you feared they would lead to European complications.  I disclaimed any British lack of sympathy with Austria in the matter of her legitimate grievances against Servia, and pointed out that, whereas Austria seemed to be making these the starting point of her policy, His Majesty’s Government were bound to look at the question primarily from the point of view of the maintenance of the peace of Europe.  In this way the two countries might easily drift apart.

His Excellency said that he too was keeping the European aspect of the question in sight.  He thought, however, that Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement.  His Excellency remarked to me in the course of his conversation that, though he had been glad to co-operate towards bringing about the settlement which had resulted from the ambassadorial conferences in London during the Balkan crisis, he had never had much belief in the permanency of that settlement, which was necessarily of a highly artificial character, inasmuch as the interests which it sought to harmonise were in themselves profoundly divergent.  His Excellency maintained a most friendly demeanour throughout the interview, but left no doubt in my mind as to the determination of the Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed with the invasion of Servia.