I said that it was quite wrong to suppose that we had left Germany under the impression that we would not intervene.  I had refused overtures to promise that we should remain neutral.  I had not only definitely declined to say that we would remain neutral, I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German Ambassador that, if France and Germany became involved in war, we should be drawn into it.  That, of course, was not the same thing as taking an engagement to France, and I told M. Cambon of it only to show that we had not left Germany under the impression that we would stand aside.

M. Cambon then asked me for my reply to what he had said yesterday.

I said that we had come to the conclusion, in the Cabinet to-day, that we could not give any pledge at the present time.  Though we should have to put our policy before Parliament, we could not pledge Parliament in advance.  Up to the present moment, we did not feel, and public opinion did not feel, that any treaties or obligations of this country were involved.  Further developments might alter this situation and cause the Government and Parliament to take the view that intervention was justified.  The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be, I would not say a decisive, but an important factor, in determining our attitude.  Whether we proposed to Parliament to intervene or not to intervene in a war, Parliament would wish to know how we stood with regard to the neutrality of Belgium, and it might be that I should ask both France and Germany whether each was prepared to undertake an engagement that she would not be the first to violate the neutrality of Belgium.

M. Cambon repeated his question whether we would help France if Germany made an attack on her.

I said that I could only adhere to the answer that, as far as things had gone at present, we could not take any engagement.

M. Cambon urged that Germany had from the beginning rejected proposals that might have made for peace.  It could not be to England’s interest that France should be crushed by Germany.  We should then be in a very diminished position with regard to Germany.  In 1870 we had made a great mistake in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we should now be repeating the mistake.  He asked me whether I could not submit his question to the Cabinet again.

I said that the Cabinet would certainly be summoned as soon as there was some new development, but at the present moment the only answer I could give was that we could not undertake any definite engagement.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 122.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—­(Received August 1.)

(Telegraphic.) Berlin, July 31, 1914.

Neutrality of Belgium, referred to in your telegram of 31st July to Sir
F. Bertie.

I have seen Secretary of State, who informs me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer.  I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful whether they would return any answer at all.  His Excellency, nevertheless, took note of your request.