Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Such then was the treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of Luxemburg, which was proposed, it may be observed, by Prussia herself; but, until the treaty was broken by the very Power which had proposed the neutrality, only one incident need be noted in the history of the country, namely, the part it played in the war of 1870-1.  On December 3, 1870, Count Bismarck issued from Versailles a circular to the Prussian Ambassadors, calling attention to the fact that both the French and the Luxemburgers had violated the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, mainly by giving facilities for French soldiers to return to France.  Precautions were taken by the Prussian Government on the frontier to prevent such abuses occurring in the future, and as no violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg was committed by the Prussians, the neutral co-guarantors were satisfied with the Prussian attitude, and the subject dropped.  At the end of the war, M. Thiers vainly attempted to obtain Luxemburg as compensation for the loss of Metz.

In accordance with the Family Compact of 1783, the Grand Duchy passed on the death of the late King of Holland to Prince William of Nassau, on whose death the present Grand Duchess succeeded to her father’s throne.

There is one point in the Treaty of 1867 which calls for special comment.  The neutrality of the Grand Duchy is ’placed under the collective guarantee of the Powers signing’.  The phrase originally proposed by Count Bismarck was ’the formal and individual guarantee of the Powers,’ and it was altered at the instance of the English Foreign Minister, Lord Stanley.  The phrase actually adopted was suggested by the Russian diplomat, Baron Brunnow, and was accepted both by England and by Prussia.  Lord Stanley’s objection had been based upon the fear that England might incur an unlimited liability to assist Luxemburg single-handed if all other Powers failed to meet their obligations.  In other words, Luxemburg might have been used as the infallible means of dragging us into every and any war which might arise between Germany and France.  From that danger we were protected by Lord Stanley’s objection; as the case stands the treaty gives us, in his own words, ’a right to make war, but would not necessarily impose the obligation,’ should Luxemburg be attacked.  To this doctrine a reference will be found in the British White Paper (No. 148), where Sir Edward Grey informs M. Cambon of ‘the doctrine’ concerning Luxemburg, ’laid down by Lord Derby and Lord Clarendon in 1867’.  It may also be observed that two of the co-guarantors of the Treaty of 1867, namely Italy and Holland, have also not thought it necessary to make the violation of Luxemburg a casus belli.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.