After telling M. Cambon to-day how grave the situation seemed to be, I told him that I meant to tell the German Ambassador to-day that he must not be misled by the friendly tone of our conversations into any sense of false security that we should stand aside if all the efforts to preserve the peace, which we were now making in common with Germany, failed.  But I went on to say to M. Cambon that I thought it necessary to tell him also that public opinion here approached the present difficulty from a quite different point of view from that taken during the difficulty as to Morocco a few years ago.  In the case of Morocco the dispute was one in which France was primarily interested, and in which it appeared that Germany, in an attempt to crush France, was fastening a quarrel on France on a question that was the subject of a special agreement between France and us.  In the present case the dispute between Austria and Servia was not one in which we felt called to take a hand.  Even if the question became one between Austria and Russia we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it.  It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—­a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question.  If Germany became involved and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider.  France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage.  We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.  I thought it necessary to say that, because, as he knew, we were taking all precautions with regard to our fleet, and I was about to warn Prince Lichnowsky not to count on our standing aside, but it would not be fair that I should let M. Cambon be misled into supposing that this meant that we had decided what to do in a contingency that I still hoped might not arise.

M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.  He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany and France become involved, so that the question became one of the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was necessary for us to do.  He seemed quite prepared for this announcement, and made no criticism upon it.

He said French opinion was calm, but decided.  He anticipated a demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany attacked Russia.  This assurance France, of course, could not give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

Sir, Foreign Office, July 29, 1914.