Secretary of State says that conference you suggest would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not, in his opinion, be called together except at the request of Austria and Russia.  He could not therefore fall in with your suggestion, desirous though he was to co-operate for the maintenance of peace.  I said I was sure that your idea had nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of the four nations not directly interested should discuss and suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation.  He maintained, however, that such a conference as you proposed was not practicable.  He added that news he had just received from St. Petersburgh showed that there was an intention on the part of M. de Sazonof to exchange views with Count Berchtold.  He thought that this method of procedure might lead to a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between the Austrian and Russian Governments.

In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said that as yet Austria was only partially mobilising, but that if Russia mobilised against Germany latter would have to follow suit.  I asked him what he meant by “mobilising against Germany.”  He said that if Russia only mobilised in south, Germany would not mobilise, but if she mobilised in north, Germany would have to do so too, and Russian system of mobilisation was so complicated that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilisation.  Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken by surprise.

Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburgh had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general situation.

No. 56.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Edward Grey.—­(Received July 28.)

(Telegraphic.) Vienna, July 27, 1914.

The Russian Ambassador had to-day a long and earnest conversation with Baron Macchio, the Under-secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.  He told him that, having just come back from St. Petersburgh, he was well acquainted with the views of the Russian Government and the state of Russian public opinion.  He could assure him that if actual war broke out with Servia it would be impossible to localise it, for Russia was not prepared to give way again, as she had done on previous occasions, and especially during the annexation crisis of 1909.  He earnestly hoped that something would be done before Servia was actually invaded.  Baron Macchio replied that this would now be difficult, as a skirmish had already taken place on the Danube, in which the Servians had been the aggressors.  The Russian Ambassador said that he would do all he could to keep the Servians quiet pending any discussions that might yet take place, and he told me that he would advise his Government to induce the Servian Government to avoid any conflict as long as possible, and to fall back before an Austrian advance.