Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 254 pages of information about Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised).

APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM

SIR EDWARD GREY’S

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE EUROPEAN

CRISIS

For the complete Correspondence see White Paper Miscellaneous No. 6 (1914) (Cd. 7467), presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty, August 1914

No. 13.

Note communicated by Russian Ambassador, July 25.

(Translation.)

M. Sazionof telegraphs to the Russian Charge d’Affaires at Vienna on the 11th (24th) July, 1914: 

“The communication made by Austria-Hungary to the Powers the day after the presentation of the ultimatum at Belgrade leaves a period to the Powers which is quite insufficient to enable them to take any steps which might help to smooth away the difficulties that have arisen.

“In order to prevent the consequences, equally incalculable and fatal to all the Powers, which may result from the course of action followed by the Austro-Hungarian Government, it seems to us to be above all essential that the period allowed for the Servian reply should be extended.  Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the Powers of the results of the enquiry upon which the Imperial and Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow them sufficient time to study them.

“In this case, if the Powers were convinced that certain of the Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position to offer advice to the Servian Government.

“A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of international relations.

“Prince Kudachef is instructed to communicate the above to the Cabinet at Vienna.

“M.  Sazonof hopes that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will adhere to the point of view set forth above, and he trusts that Sir E. Grey will see his way to furnish similar instructions to the British Ambassador at Vienna.”

No. 17.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—­(Received July 25.)

(Telegraphic.) St. Petersburgh, July 25, 1914.

I Saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning....

The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Servia was quite ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept the political demands which had been put forward.  The Minister for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had with the Servian Minister yesterday, that, in the event of the Austrians attacking Servia, the Servian Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the Powers to help them.  His Excellency was in favour of their making this appeal.  He would like to see the question placed on an international footing, as the obligations taken by Servia in 1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were given not to Austria, but to the Powers.

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Why We Are at War (2nd Edition, revised) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.