executive government that could not fail to be attended with great public inconvenience.  An institution to control the government of India must be either totally independent of the government of this country or subordinate to it.”  “The board was to consist of none but privy councillors,” and instead of the vast amount of patronage which was to have been created by the bill of 1783, this board was “to create no increase of officers nor to impose any new burdens.” ...  “The first and leading ideas would be, to limit the subsisting patronage;” ... and so little was Pitt covetous to engross that which did and must continue to subsist, that he left even “the officers of the government of Bengal to the nomination of the Court of Directors, subject only to the negative of the crown; and the Court of Directors was also to have the nomination of the officers of all the subordinate governments, except only of the commander-in-chief, who, for various reasons, must remain to be appointed by the crown.”  Another very important part of the arrangement was, that “gradation and succession were to be the general rule of promotion,” a regulation which of itself would be “a forcible check upon patronage, and tend greatly to its reduction.”  The governor of Bengal was to be the governor-general of the whole country, the governors of Madras and Bombay being subordinate to him; and each governor was to be assisted by a council of three members, of whom the commander of the forces was to be one.

The spirit in which a law or a government is administered is commonly of greater practical importance than the words in which the regulation or the system is framed or defined; and Pitt, therefore, concluded his speech by laying down a few “clear and simple principles as those from which alone a good government could arise.  The first and principal object would be to take care to prevent the government from being ambitious and bent on conquest.  Commerce was our object, and, with a view to its extension, a pacific system should prevail, and a system of defence and conciliation.  The government there ought, therefore, in an especial manner, to avoid wars, or entering into alliances likely to create wars.”  It was not to forget “to pay a due regard to self-defence, or to guard against sudden hostilities from neighboring powers, and, whenever there was reason to apprehend attack, to be in a state of preparation.  This was indispensably necessary; but whenever such circumstances occurred, the executive government in India was not to content itself with acting there as the circumstances of the case might require; it was also to send immediate advice home of what had happened, of what measures had been taken in consequence, and what farther measures were intended to be pursued; and a tribunal was to be established to take cognizance of such matters.”  The system of taking presents from the natives was to be absolutely prohibited, a regulation which he hoped would “tend effectually