view, or they would hardly assert their right to enjoy
the pleasure of offering an insult.” He
was answered by Lord Northington (the Chancellor)
and by Lord Mansfield (the Chief-justice), both of
whom supported the motion to repeal the tax, but who
also agreed in denying the soundness of his doctrine
that, as far as the power was concerned, there was
any distinction between a law to tax and a law for
any other purpose; and Lord Mansfield farther denied
the validity of the argument which it had been attempted
to found on the circumstance that the Colonies were
not represented in Parliament, propounding, on the
contrary, what Lord Campbell calls “his doctrine
of virtual representation.” “There
can,” said he, “be no doubt but that the
inhabitants of the Colonies are represented in Parliament,
as the greatest part of the people of England are
represented, among nine millions of whom there are
eight who have no votes in electing members of Parliament.
Every objection, therefore, to the dependency of the
Colonies upon Parliament which arises upon the ground
of representation goes to the whole present constitution
of Great Britain.... For what purpose, then,
are arguments drawn from a distinction in which there
is no real difference of a virtual and an actual representation?
A member of Parliament chosen for any borough represents
not only the constituents and inhabitants of that
particular place, but he represents the inhabitants
of every other borough in Great Britain. He represents
the City of London and all the other Commons of the
land, and the inhabitants of all the colonies and
dominions of Great Britain, and is in duty and conscience
bound to take care of their interests.”
Lord Mansfield’s doctrine of a virtual representation
of the Colonies must be admitted to be overstrained.
The analogy between the case of colonists in a country
from no part of which representatives are sent to
Parliament, and that of a borough or county where some
classes of the population which may, in a sense, be
regarded as spokesmen or agents of the rest form a
constituency and return members, must be allowed to
fail; yet the last sentences of this extract are worth
preserving, as laying down the important constitutional
principle, subsequently expanded and enforced with
irresistible learning and power of argument by Burke,
that a member of the House of Commons is not a delegate,
bound, under all circumstances, to follow the opinions
or submit to the dictation of his constituents, but
that from the moment of his election he is a councillor
of the whole kingdom, bound to exercise an independent
judgment for the interests of the whole people, rather
than to guide himself by the capricious or partial
judgments of a small section of it. But in its
more immediate objects—that of establishing
the two principles, that the constitution knows of
no limitation to the authority of Parliament, and
of no distinction between the power of taxation and
that of any other kind of legislation—Lord
Mansfield’s speech is now universally admitted
to have been unanswerable.[38]