action had been exerted by each or by all.”  He entered into the history of the question, explaining that, though “each branch of the Legislature retained its respective power of rejecting any measure, the Commons had claimed from time immemorial particular privileges in regard to particular measures, and especially the exclusive right of determining matters connected with the taxation of the people.  They claimed for themselves, and denied to the Lords, the right of originating, altering, or amending such measures; but, as long ago as 1671, the Attorney-general, in a memorable conference between the two Houses, had admitted that the Lords, though they could not originate or amend, had, nevertheless, power to reject money-bills;” and this admission he regarded as consistent with common-sense, for “it was well known that, though the Commons contended for the right of originating measures for the grant of supply, and of framing bills with that object, according to their belief of what was best for the public interest, yet such bills could not pass into law without the assent of the Lords; and it was clear that an authority whose assent was necessary to give a proposal the force of law, must, by the very nature of things, be at liberty to dissent and refuse its sanction.”

The committee had enumerated a large number of precedents (above thirty) in which, since that conference, the Lords had rejected such bills; but the cases were not in general exactly similar to that now under consideration, since the bills which they had rejected had commonly, if not in every case, been for the imposition and not for the repeal of a tax; and in most cases some question of national policy had been involved which had influenced their vote.  But the view which Lord Palmerston pressed on the House was that the present was “a case in which party feelings ought to be cast aside.  It was one in which higher and larger interests than those of party were concerned, and in which the course that the House now took would be a precedent to guide future Parliaments.”  He pointed out, moreover, that the smallness of the majority in the House of Commons had been to the Lords “some encouragement to take this particular step,” and that “he was himself led to think that they had taken it, not from any intention to step out of their province, and to depart from the line of constitutional right which the history of the country has assigned them, but from motives of policy dependent on the circumstances of the moment; and therefore he thought it would be wise if the Commons forbore to enter into a conflict with the Lords on a ground which might really not exist, but satisfied themselves with a declaration of what were their own constitutional powers and privileges.  It was of the utmost importance in a constitution like ours, where there are different branches, independent of each other, each with powers of its own, and where cordial and harmonious action is necessary, that care should be taken to avoid the commencement of an unnecessary quarrel, and the party that acted otherwise would incur a grave responsibility.”