As to the Duke of Wellington’s assumption of a variety of offices, it is probable that when he first proposed to the King to confer them on him, he anticipated no objection whatever from any quarter, since he had so little idea of there being any impropriety in holding two offices, were they ever so apparently incongruous, if his Majesty should have directed him to do so, that seven years before, when he became Prime-minister, he had at first designed permanently to retain the command of the army in conjunction with the Treasury, and had only been induced to abandon the intention by the urgent remonstrance of Sir Robert Peel; and, constitutionally, there does not seem to be any limitation of the sovereign’s power to confer offices, to unite or to divide them. Indeed, the different Secretary-ships of State seem to owe their existence entirely to his will, and not to any act of Parliament. He can diminish the number, if he should think fit, as he did in 1782, when, on the termination of the American war, he forbore to appoint a successor to Lord George Germaine, in Lord Rockingham’s administration; or he can increase the numbers, as he did in 1794, when he revived the third Secretaryship, which he had suppressed twelve years before, without any act of Parliament being passed to direct either the suspension or the revival. He can even leave the most important offices vacant, and intrust the performance of their duties to a commission, as was done in this very year 1835, when the Great Seal was put in commission, and the duties, for above two years, were performed by commissioners, who had other duties also to discharge; and these instances may, perhaps, warrant the conclusion that the distribution of the different posts in what is generally known as the cabinet is dictated by considerations of what is practicable and expedient rather than by any positive and invariable rule or principle.
Yet it does not follow that, because the constitution was not violated or endangered by such an arrangement, the leaders of the Opposition did other than their duty in calling attention to it. Unquestionably, it is historically true that the liberties of the people owe their preservation, growth, and vigor to the jealous watchfulness to check the first and slightest appearance of any attempt to encroach upon them, which has been constantly exercised from the very earliest times by an almost unbroken series of fearless and independent patriots. And in this instance the very novelty of such an arrangement as had taken place did of itself make criticism a duty; though it may also be thought that the critics acted wisely in contenting themselves with calling notice to it, and abstaining from asking Parliament to pronounce a formal judgment on it, since any express censure would have been unwarranted either by the facts of the case or by any inference to be drawn from previous usage, while an approval of it would wear the appearance not only of sanctioning, but even of inviting a repetition of an arrangement which, if ever attempted to be carried out in actual practice, must tend to grave inconvenience, if not to discredit.