his ministers was undoubted and inalienable, yet the
Houses had a clear right to sit in judgment on any
particular exercise of it; and that the circumstances
of the late ministry having been but recently formed,
of its possessing in a conspicuous degree the confidence
of the great majority of the House of Commons, and
of its being occupied at the moment of its dismissal
with matters of high national concern, justified the
House in calling on the new ministers to show valid
reasons for its sudden dismissal. As to the dissolution,
it was asked what misdemeanor the late House of Commons
had committed? No difference had occurred between
it and the other House of Parliament. It had passed
no hostile vote against any administration. It
had been in existence but a very short time.
All these circumstances, they affirmed, made it reasonable
for the Houses to express to his Majesty their disapprobation
of the dissolution. Lord Morpeth argued, moreover,
that the right of the House of Commons to inquire
into such an exercise of the royal prerogative was
proved by the example of Mr. Pitt, who, in 1784, had
introduced into the speech from the throne a paragraph
inviting Parliament to approve of the recent dissolution;
and what Parliament could be asked to approve of, it
manifestly had an equal right to censure. But
the most vehement of the censures of the Opposition
were directed against what Lord Morpeth called “the
most unseemly huddling of offices in the single person
of the Duke of Wellington; an unconstitutional concentration
of responsibility and power, at which there was hardly
an old Whig of the Rockingham school whose hair did
not stand on end.” He admitted that in
the present instance the arrangement had only been
provisional and temporary, and that “no harm
had been done;” but, he asked, “what harm
might not have been done? If the country had been
suddenly obliged to go to war, who would have been
responsible for the Foreign Department? If an
insurrection of the negroes had occurred, who was responsible
for the Colonial Office? If in Ireland any tithe
dispute had arisen, who was responsible as Home-secretary?”
And Lord Melbourne, though a speaker generally remarkable
for moderation, on this subject went much farther;
and, after urging that, “if one person held the
situation of First Lord of the Treasury, and also
that of Secretary of State for the Home Department,
it would not only place in his hands without any control
the appointment to every great office in the state,
but a person so situated would also have the pecuniary
resources of the state at his disposal without check
or investigation,” he proceeded to assert that
“an intention to exercise those offices would
amount to a treasonable misdemeanor.” He
did not, indeed, go so far as his late Attorney-general,
Sir J. Campbell, who, in vexation at his loss of office,
had even threatened the Duke with impeachment; but,
though he admitted that the Duke had been free from
the guilty intention of exercising the authority of
these offices, he suggested that “the Lords
ought to pass some resolution calculated to prevent
so great a breach of the constitution from being drawn
into a precedent.”