There was one peculiarity in the line taken by the opponents of the bill, that they did not deny that the meetings which had induced the ministers to propose it were an evil, dangerous to the general tranquillity; but it was strongly urged by Lord Erskine and others that the existing laws were quite strong enough to deal with them, so that a new enactment was superfluous; and by others, in both Houses, that such meetings were “an ancient and constitutional mode of discussing abuses or petitioning Parliament,” any interference with which was a greater evil than the meetings themselves, as being a violation of the constitution.  Mr. Brougham in particular admitted, to the full extent of the assertions of the ministers themselves, “the wickedness and folly of many of the speeches” made at the recent meetings.  He expressed with great force his entire disapproval of the system on which these meetings had been conducted, and admitted that the martial array which had been exhibited, and the vastness of the numbers of those who had attended, were of themselves calculated to excite alarm; but he declared that “he could not on that account acquiesce in a total subversion of a popular right.”  On the other hand, the ministers themselves did not deny “the general right of the people to petition the Legislature, or to carry their addresses to the foot of the throne.  And therefore (as Lord Harrowby, the President of the Council, admitted) there could be no doubt of their right to assemble, so far as was necessary to agree to their petitions or addresses.  It was a right that did not depend on the Bill of Rights, on which it was usually grounded, but had existed long before.  But this bill,” he contended, “imposed no restrictions on the legitimate enjoyment of that privilege; it only regulated the meetings at which it was to be exercised.”  And Lord Liverpool affirmed that the bill was not only “consistent with the existing laws and principles of the constitution, but was even proposed in furtherance of those principles, and for the purpose of protecting the people of this country against a series of evils which, if not checked, must subvert their laws and liberties.”

In attempting to form a correct judgment on the question whether this bill were constitutional or unconstitutional, it must, I think, be admitted that, as has been remarked before, the terms “constitutional” and “unconstitutional” are somewhat vague and elastic.  There is no one document—­not Magna Charta, nor the Petition of Eight, nor the Bill of Rights—­which can be said to contain the whole of the British constitution.  Its spirit and principles are, indeed, to be found in all the laws, to which they give animation and life, but not in any one law.  And among its leading principles are those which embrace the right of every individual to freedom of action and freedom of speech, so long as he does not commit any crime himself, nor tempt others to do so.  Yet it does not follow that a new enactment which for a while abridges or suspends that freedom of action or speech is inconsistent with those constitutional principles.