according to the law of the land, and the known and established law of Parliament, which was part thereof.’” It was understood that this resolution, if carried, was intended as a stepping-stone to others which should condemn the decision of the previous session; yet it seemed such a truism that even the ministers could not venture to deny it; but they proposed to defeat the object of its framers by adding to it a declaration that the late decision was “agreeable to the said law of the land.”  And we might pass on to the subsequent debate, in which the constitutional correctness of that addition was distinctly challenged, did it not seem desirable to notice two arguments which were brought forward against the motion, one by an independent member, Mr. Ongley, the other by the Attorney-general.  Mr. Ongley contended that “a power of preserving order and decency is essentially necessary to every aggregate body; and, with respect to this House, if it had not power over its particular members, they would be subject to no control at all.”  The answer to this argument is obvious:  that a right on the part of the House to control the conduct of its members is a wholly different thing from a right to determine who are or ought to be members; and that for the House to claim this latter right, except on grounds of qualification or disqualification legally proved, would be to repeat one of the most monstrous of all Cromwell’s acts of tyranny, when, in 1656, he placed guards at the door of the House, with orders to refuse admission to all those members whom, however lawfully elected, he did not expect to find sufficiently compliant for his purposes.  Mr. De Grey’s argument was of a different character, being based on what he foretold would be the practical result of a decision that expulsion did not involve an incapacity to be re-elected.  If it did not involve such incapacity, and if, in consequence, Mr. Wilkes should be re-elected, he considered that the House would naturally feel it its duty to re-expel him as often as the constituency re-elected him.  But one answer given to this argument was, that to expel a second time would be to punish twice for one offence, a proceeding at variance not only with English law but with every idea of justice.  Another, and one which has obtained greater acceptance, was, that the legitimate doctrine was, that the issue of a new writ gave the expelled member an appeal from the House to the constituency, and that the constituency had a constitutional right to overrule the judgment of the House, and to determine whether it still regarded the candidate as its most suitable representative.