He did not deny that a similar measure had been enacted under William III., again in 1715, and again in 1745; but he contended that “the present peril bore no resemblance to the dangers of those times.  This measure went to overturn the very corner-stone of the constitution, and if it passed, there was an end of the constitution of England.”  The bill was passed in both Houses by very large majorities.[124] It was originally enacted for six months only, but was from time to time renewed till the end of the century.

If we take a general survey of all these measures together, as parts of one great defensive scheme for the preservation of the public tranquillity and the general safety of the empire, it may, probably, be thought that, though undoubtedly suspensions of the constitution, they are not open to the charge of being unconstitutional, since they were enacted, not only for the welfare of the people, but with their consent and concurrence, legitimately signified by their representatives in Parliament.  It is scarcely consistent with sound reason to contend that the habeas corpus, which had been enacted by Parliament, could not be suspended by the authority which had enacted it; that the constitution, which exists for the benefit of the people, could not be suspended by the people; or to deny, if it was in appearance transgressed by these enactments, that it was yet transgressed by strictly constitutional acts, by the decision of the Parliament, to whose power the constitution prescribes no limits.

But it is not sufficient that in this point of view these measures may have been defensible.  In judging of their statesmanship, it is almost equally to be considered whether they were expedient and politic, whether the emergency or necessity were such as to justify such rigorous methods of repression.  It was fairly open to doubt whether some of them, and especially the Traitorous Correspondence and the Seditious Meetings Bills, did not treat as treasonable acts which did not go beyond sedition, and whether so to treat them were not to invest them with an importance which did not belong to them.  And on this part of the question the general judgment has, we think, been unfavorable to the government; and it has been commonly allowed that the Chancellor, whose advice on legal subjects the Prime-minister naturally took for his guide, gave him impolitic counsel.  In fact, it is well known that these two acts, to a great extent, failed in their object through their excessive severity, several juries having refused to convict persons who were prosecuted for treason, who would certainly not have escaped had they only been indicted for sedition; and it is deserving of remark that these two bills were not regarded with favor by the King himself, if the anecdote—­which seems to rest on undeniable authority—­be true, that he expressed satisfaction at the acquittal of some prisoners, on the ground that almost any evil would be more tolerable than that of putting men to death