Ib. p. 105.

They always seemed to me to act a very ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of the divine decree is absolutely irreconcilable with human liberty; because the natural and necessary liberty of a rational creature is to act or choose from a rational motive, or spontaneously, and of purpose:  but who sees not, that, on the supposition of the most absolute decree, this liberty is not taken away, but rather established and confirmed?  For the decree is, ’that such an one shall make choice of, or do some particular thing freely.  And whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chosen, whether good or indifferent, is so done or chosen, or, at least, may be so, espouses an absurdity.’

I fear, I fear, that this is a sophism not worthy of Archbishop Leighton.  It seems to me tantamount to saying—­“I force that man to do so or so without my forcing him.”  But however that may be, the following sentences are more precious than diamonds.  They are divine.

Ib.  Lect.  XI. p. 113.

For that this world, compounded of so many and such heterogeneous parts, should proceed, by way of natural and necessary emanation, from that one first, present, and most simple nature, nobody, I imagine, could believe, or in the least suspect * * *.  But if he produced all these things freely, * * how much more consistent is it to believe, that this was done in time, than to imagine it was from eternity!

It is inconceivable how any thing can be created in time; and production is incompatible with interspace.

Ib.  Lect.  XV. p. 152.

The Platonists divide the world into two, the sensible and intellectual world * * *.  According to this hypothesis, those parables and metaphors, which are often taken from natural things to illustrate such as are divine, will not be similitudes taken entirely at pleasure; but are often, in a great measure, founded in nature, and the things themselves.

I have asserted the same thing, and more fully shown wherein the difference consists of symbolic and metaphorical, in my first Lay Sermon; and the substantial correspondence of the genuine Platonic doctrine and logic with those of Lord Bacon, in my Essays on Method, in the Friend. [2]

Ib.  Lect.  XIX. p. 201.

Even the philosophers give their testimony to this truth, and their sentiments on the subject are not altogether to be rejected; for they almost unanimously are agreed, that felicity, so far as it can be enjoyed in this life, consists solely, or at least principally, in virtue:  but as to their assertion, that this virtue is perfect in a perfect life, it is rather expressing what were to be wished, than describing things as they are.

And why are the philosophers to be judged according to a different rule?  On what ground can it be asserted that the Stoics believed in the actual existence of their God-like perfection in any individual? or that they meant more than this—­“To no man can the name of the Wise be given in its absolute sense, who is not perfect even as his Father in heaven is perfect!”