at any one object, but running as it were to and fro to abstract, generalize, and classify.  Now when this faculty is employed in the service of the pure reason, it brings out the necessary and universal truths contained in the infinite into distinct contemplation by the pure act of the sensuous imagination, that is, in the production of the forms of space and time abstracted from all corporeity, and likewise of the inherent forms of the understanding itself abstractedly from the consideration of particulars, as in the case of geometry, numeral mathematics, universal logic, and pure metaphysics.  The discursive faculty then becomes what our Shakspeare with happy precision calls “discourse of reason.”

We will now take up our reasoning again from the words “motion in itself.”

It is evident then, that the reason, as the irradiative power, and the representative of the infinite, judges the understanding as the faculty of the finite, and cannot without error be judged by it.  When this is attempted, or when the understanding in its ‘synthesis’ with the personal will, usurps the supremacy of the reason, or affects to supersede the reason, it is then what St. Paul calls the mind of the flesh ([Greek:  phronaema sarkos]) or the wisdom of this world.  The result is, that the reason is super-finite; and in this relation, its antagonist is the insubordinate understanding, or mind of the flesh.

IV.  Reason, as one with the absolute will, (’In the beginning was the
    Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was God’,) and
    therefore for man the certain representative of the will of God, is
    above the will of man as an individual will.  We have seen in III.
    that it stands in antagonism to all mere particulars; but here it
    stands in antagonism to all mere individual interests as so many
    selves, to the personal will as seeking its objects in the
    manifestation of itself for itself—­’sit pro ratione
    voluntas’;—­whether this be realized with adjuncts, as in the lust
    of the flesh, and in the lust of the eye; or without adjuncts, as in
    the thirst and pride of power, despotism, egoistic ambition.  The
    fourth antagonist, then, of reason is the lust of the will.

Corollary.  Unlike a million of tigers, a million of men is very different from a million times one man.  Each man in a numerous society is not only coexistent with, but virtually organized into, the multitude of which he is an integral part.  His ‘idem’ is modified by the ‘alter’.  And there arise impulses and objects from this ‘synthesis’ of the ’alter et idem’, myself and my neighbour.  This, again, is strictly analogous to what takes place in the vital organization of the individual man.  The cerebral system of nerves has its correspondent ‘antithesis’ in the abdominal system:  but hence arises a ‘synthesis’ of the two in the pectoral system as the intermediate, and, like a drawbridge, at once conductor and boundary.