Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4. eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 404 pages of information about Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4..

Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4. eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 404 pages of information about Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4..

That there is a sophism here, every one must feel in the very fact of being ‘non-plus’d’ without being convinced.  The sophism consists in the instance being ‘haud ejusdem generis’ ([Greek:  elegchos metabaseos eis allo genos]); and what the allogeneity is between the assurance of the being of Madrid or Constantinople, and the belief of the fact of the resurrection of Christ, I have shown elsewhere.  The universal belief of the ‘tyrannicidium’ of Julius Caesar is doubtless a fairer instance, but the whole mode of argument is unsound and unsatisfying.  Why run off from the fact in question, or the class at least to which it belongs?  The victory can be but accidental—­a victory obtained by the unguarded logic, or want of logical foresight of the antagonist, who needs only narrow his positions to narrations of facts and events, in our judgment of which we are not aided by the analogy of previous and succeeding experience, to deprive you of the opportunity of skirmishing thus on No Man’s land.  But this is Skelton’s ruling passion, sometimes his strength—­too often his weakness.  He must force the reader to believe:  or rather he has an antagonist, a wilful infidel or heretic always and exclusively before his imagination; or if he thinks of the reader at all, it is as of a partizan enjoying every hard thump, and smashing ‘fister’ he gives the adversary, whom Skelton hates too cordially to endure to obtain any thing from him with his own liking.  No!  It must be against his will, and in spite of it.  No thanks to him—­the dog could not help himself!  How much more effectual would he have found it to have commenced by placing himself in a state of sympathy with the supposed sceptic or unbeliever;—­to have stated to him his own feelings, and the real grounds on which they rested;—­to have shown himself the difference between the historical facts which the sceptic takes for granted and believes spontaneously, as it were,—­and those, which are to be the subject of discussion; and this brings the question at once to the proof.  And here, after all, lies the strength of Skelton’s reasoning, which would have worked far more powerfully, had it come first and single, and with the whole attention directed towards it.

Ib. p. 35.

  ‘Templeton.’  Surely the resurrection of Christ, or any other man,
               cannot be a thing impossible with God.  It is neither
               above his power, nor, when employed for a sufficient
               purpose, inconsistent with his majesty, wisdom, and
               goodness.

This is the ever open and vulnerable part of Deism.  The Deist, as a Deist, believes, ‘implicite’ at least, so many and stupendous miracles as to render his disbelief of lesser miracles, simply because they are miraculous, gross inconsistencies.  To have the battle fairly fought out, Spinoza, or a Bhuddist, or a Burmese Gymnosoph, should be challenged.  Then, I am deeply persuaded, would the truth appear in full evidence, that no Christ, no God,—­and, conversely, if the Father, then the Son.  I can never too often repeat, that revealed religion is a pleonasm.  —­Religion is revelation, and revelation the only religion.

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Coleridge's Literary Remains, Volume 4. from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.