Ib. p. 68.

Nor do we divide the substance, but unite these three Persons in one numerical essence:  for we know nothing of the unity of the mind, but self-consciousness, as I showed before; and therefore as the self-consciousness of every Person to itself makes them distinct Persons, so the mutual consciousness of all three divine Persons to each other makes them all but one infinite God:  as far as consciousness reaches, so far the unity of a spirit extends, for we know no other unity of a mind or spirit, but consciousness.

But this contradicts the preceding paragraph, in which the Father is self-conscious that he is the Father and not the Son, and the Son that he is not the Father, and that the Father is not he.  Now how can the Son’s being conscious that the Father is conscious that he is not the Son, constitute a numerical unity?  And wherein can such a consciousness as that attributed to the Son differ from absolute certainty?  Is not God conscious of every thought of man;—­and would Sherlock allow me to deduce the unity of the divine consciousness with the human?  Sherlock’s is doubtless a very plain and intelligible account of three Gods in the most absolute intimacy with each other, so that they are all as one; but by no means of three persons that are one God.  I do not wonder that Waterland and the other followers of Bull were alarmed.

Ib. p. 72.

Even among men it is only knowledge that is power.  Human power, and human knowledge, as that signifies a knowledge how to do anything, are commensurate; whatever human skill extends to, human power can effect:  nay, every man can do what he knows how to do, if he has proper instruments and materials to do it with.

This proves that perfect knowledge supposes perfect power:  and that they are one and the same.  “If he have proper instruments:”—­does not this show that the means are supposed co-present with the knowledge, not the same with it?

Ib.

For it is nothing but thought which moves our bodies, and all the members of them, which are the immediate instruments of all human force and power:  excepting mechanical motions which do not depend upon our wills, such as the motion of the heart, the circulation of the blood, the concoction of our meat and the like.  All voluntary motions are not only directed but caused by thought:  and so indeed it must be, or there could be no motion in the world; for matter cannot move itself, and therefore some mind must be the first mover, which makes it very plain, that infinite truth and wisdom is infinite and almighty power.

Even this, though not ill-conceived, is inaccurately expressed.

Ib. p. 81.