ourselves merry with other men’s obliquities, when as he himself is more faulty than the rest, mutato nomine, de te fabula narratur, he may take himself by the nose for a fool; and which one calls maximum stultitiae specimen, to be ridiculous to others, and not to perceive or take notice of it, as Marsyas was when he contended with Apollo, non intelligens se deridiculo haberi, saith [404] Apuleius; ’tis his own cause, he is a convicted madman, as [405]Austin well infers “in the eyes of wise men and angels he seems like one, that to our thinking walks with his heels upwards.”  So thou laughest at me, and I at thee, both at a third; and he returns that of the poet upon us again, [406]_Hei mihi, insanire me aiunt, quum ipsi ultro insaniant_.  We accuse others of madness, of folly, and are the veriest dizzards ourselves.  For it is a great sign and property of a fool (which Eccl. x. 3, points at) out of pride and self-conceit to insult, vilify, condemn, censure, and call other men fools (Non videmus manticae quod a tergo est) to tax that in others of which we are most faulty; teach that which we follow not ourselves:  For an inconstant man to write of constancy, a profane liver prescribe rules of sanctity and piety, a dizzard himself make a treatise of wisdom, or with Sallust to rail downright at spoilers of countries, and yet in [407]office to be a most grievous poller himself.  This argues weakness, and is an evident sign of such parties’ indiscretion. [408]_Peccat uter nostrum cruce dignius_?  “Who is the fool now?” Or else peradventure in some places we are all mad for company, and so ’tis not seen, Satietas erroris et dementiae, pariter absurditatem et admirationem tollit.  ’Tis with us, as it was of old (in [409]Tully’s censure at least) with C. Pimbria in Rome, a bold, hair-brain, mad fellow, and so esteemed of all, such only excepted, that were as mad as himself:  now in such a case there is [410]no notice taken of it.

       “Nimirum insanus paucis videatur; eo quod
        Maxima pars hominum morbo jactatur eodem.”

       “When all are mad, where all are like opprest
        Who can discern one mad man from the rest?”

But put case they do perceive it, and some one be manifestly convicted of madness, [411]he now takes notice of his folly, be it in action, gesture, speech, a vain humour he hath in building, bragging, jangling, spending, gaming, courting, scribbling, prating, for which he is ridiculous to others, [412]on which he dotes, he doth acknowledge as much:  yet with all the rhetoric thou hast, thou canst not so recall him, but to the contrary notwithstanding, he will persevere in his dotage.  ’Tis amabilis insania, et mentis gratissimus error, so pleasing, so delicious, that he [413] cannot leave it.  He knows his error, but will not seek to decline it, tell him what the event will be, beggary, sorrow, sickness, disgrace, shame, loss, madness, yet [414]"an angry man will prefer vengeance, a lascivious his whore, a thief his booty, a glutton his belly, before his welfare.”  Tell an epicure, a covetous man, an ambitious man of his irregular course, wean him from it a little, pol me occidistis amici, he cries anon, you have undone him, and as [415]a “dog to his vomit,” he returns to it again; no persuasion will take place, no counsel, say what thou canst,