When [219]Socrates had taken great pains to find out a wise man, and to that purpose had consulted with philosophers, poets, artificers, he concludes all men were fools; and though it procured him both anger and much envy, yet in all companies he would openly profess it. When [220] Supputius in Pontanus had travelled all over Europe to confer with a wise man, he returned at last without his errand, and could find none. [221] Cardan concurs with him, “Few there are (for aught I can perceive) well in their wits.” So doth [222]Tully, “I see everything to be done foolishly and unadvisedly.”
“Ille
sinistrorsum, hic dextrorsum, unus utrique
Error,
sed variis illudit partibus omnes.”
“One
reels to this, another to that wall,
’Tis
the same error that deludes them all.”
[223]They dote all, but not alike, [Greek: Mania gar pasin homoia], not in the same kind, “One is covetous, a second lascivious, a third ambitious, a fourth envious,” &c. as Damasippus the Stoic hath well illustrated in the poet,
[224] “Desipiunt omnes aeque ac tu.”
“And
they who call you fool, with equal claim
May
plead an ample title to the name.”
’Tis an inbred malady in every one of us, there is seminarium stultitiae, a seminary of folly, “which if it be stirred up, or get ahead, will run in infinitum, and infinitely varies, as we ourselves are severally addicted,” saith [225]Balthazar Castilio: and cannot so easily be rooted out, it takes such fast hold, as Tully holds, altae radices stultitiae, [226]so we are bred, and so we continue. Some say there be two main defects of wit, error and ignorance, to which all others are reduced; by ignorance we know not things necessary, by error we know them falsely. Ignorance is a privation, error a positive act. From ignorance comes vice, from error heresy, &c. But make how many kinds you will, divide and subdivide, few men are free, or that do not impinge on some one kind or other. [227]_Sic plerumque agitat stultos inscitia_, as he that examines his own and other men’s actions shall find.