Affections of the Senses, sleep and waking.] The affections of these senses are sleep and waking, common to all sensible creatures.  “Sleep is a rest or binding of the outward senses, and of the common sense, for the preservation of body and soul” (as Scaliger [990]defines it); for when the common sense resteth, the outward senses rest also.  The phantasy alone is free, and his commander reason:  as appears by those imaginary dreams, which are of divers kinds, natural, divine, demoniacal, &c., which vary according to humours, diet, actions, objects, &c., of which Artemidorus, Cardanus, and Sambucus, with their several interpretators, have written great volumes.  This litigation of senses proceeds from an inhibition of spirits, the way being stopped by which they should come; this stopping is caused of vapours arising out of the stomach, filling the nerves, by which the spirits should be conveyed.  When these vapours are spent, the passage is open, and the spirits perform their accustomed duties:  so that “waking is the action and motion of the senses, which the spirits dispersed over all parts cause.”

SUBSECT.  VIII.—­Of the Moving Faculty.

Appetite] This moving faculty is the other power of the sensitive soul, which causeth all those inward and outward animal motions in the body.  It is divided into two faculties, the power of appetite, and of moving from place to place.  This of appetite is threefold, so some will have it; natural, as it signifies any such inclination, as of a stone to fall downward, and such actions as retention, expulsion, which depend not on sense, but are vegetal, as the appetite of meat and drink; hunger and thirst.  Sensitive is common to men and brutes.  Voluntary, the third, or intellective, which commands the other two in men, and is a curb unto them, or at least should be, but for the most part is captivated and overruled by them; and men are led like beasts by sense, giving reins to their concupiscence and several lusts.  For by this appetite the soul is led or inclined to follow that good which the senses shall approve, or avoid that which they hold evil:  his object being good or evil, the one he embraceth, the other he rejecteth; according to that aphorism, Omnia appetunt bonum, all things seek their own good, or at least seeming good.  This power is inseparable from sense, for where sense is, there are likewise pleasure and pain.  His organ is the same with the common sense, and is divided into two powers, or inclinations, concupiscible or irascible:  or (as one [991] translates it) coveting, anger invading, or impugning.  Concupiscible covets always pleasant and delightsome things, and abhors that which is distasteful, harsh, and unpleasant. Irascible, quasi [992] aversans per iram et odium, as avoiding it with anger and indignation.  All affections and perturbations arise out of these two fountains, which, although the stoics make light of, we hold natural, and not to be resisted.  The good