And although for the above-named reasons, I had a just cause to undertake this subject, to point at these particular species of dotage, that so men might acknowledge their imperfections, and seek to reform what is amiss; yet I have a more serious intent at this time; and to omit all impertinent digressions, to say no more of such as are improperly melancholy, or metaphorically mad, lightly mad, or in disposition, as stupid, angry, drunken, silly, sottish, sullen, proud, vainglorious, ridiculous, beastly, peevish, obstinate, impudent, extravagant, dry, doting, dull, desperate, harebrain, &c. mad, frantic, foolish, heteroclites, which no new [795] hospital can hold, no physic help; my purpose and endeavour is, in the following discourse to anatomise this humour of melancholy, through all its parts and species, as it is an habit, or an ordinary disease, and that philosophically, medicinally, to show the causes, symptoms, and several cures of it, that it may be the better avoided.  Moved thereunto for the generality of it, and to do good, it being a disease so frequent, as [796] Mercurialis observes, “in these our days; so often happening,” saith [797] Laurentius, “in our miserable times,” as few there are that feel not the smart of it.  Of the same mind is Aelian Montaltus, [798]Melancthon, and others; [799]Julius Caesar Claudinus calls it the “fountain of all other diseases, and so common in this crazed age of ours, that scarce one of a thousand is free from it;” and that splenetic hypochondriacal wind especially, which proceeds from the spleen and short ribs.  Being then a disease so grievous, so common, I know not wherein to do a more general service, and spend my time better, than to prescribe means how to prevent and cure so universal a malady, an epidemical disease, that so often, so much crucifies the body and mind.

If I have overshot myself in this which hath been hitherto said, or that it is, which I am sure some will object, too fantastical, “too light and comical for a Divine, too satirical for one of my profession,” I will presume to answer with [800]Erasmus, in like case, ’tis not I, but Democritus, Democritus dixit:  you must consider what it is to speak in one’s own or another’s person, an assumed habit and name; a difference betwixt him that affects or acts a prince’s, a philosopher’s, a magistrate’s, a fool’s part, and him that is so indeed; and what liberty those old satirists have had; it is a cento collected from others; not I, but they that say it.

[801]  “Dixero si quid forte jocosius, hoc mihi juris
Cum venia, dabis”------

       “Yet some indulgence I may justly claim,
        If too familiar with another’s fame.”

Take heed you mistake me not.  If I do a little forget myself, I hope you will pardon it.  And to say truth, why should any man be offended, or take exceptions at it?

       “Licuit, semperque licebit,
        Parcere personis, dicere de vitiis.”