Finally, it must be equally acknowledged that the Islands of Jolo, Basilan, Capul, and some of the other inferior ones, of which, as above pointed out, an union ought to be formed in the way of an additional government, subordinate to the captain-general, would be able to co-operate in the war on no other plan than the one traced out for the provinces held in Mindanao; that is, by their gunboats being confided to the protection of their own coasts; though with this difference, that if, in one instance, the main object would be to prevent the evasion of the enemy, in the other every effort must be employed to guard against and repel their incursions when they do appear.  However complete the success of the armament, destined for the reduction of Jolo, it may nevertheless be presumed, that the mountains would still continue to give shelter to hordes of fugitives, who would take refuge in the fastnesses, and avail themselves of every opportunity to concert plans, or fly off to join their comrades in Mindanao, in order to return, and through their aid, satisfy their thirst for vengeance, by surprising some fortress or settlement, or establishing themselves on some neglected and not well known point.  In consequence of this, the governor, commanding there, would at first require the active co-operation of all his forces, for the purpose of consolidating the new conquest, and causing his authority to be respected throughout the island.

[Importance of peace for Philippine progress.] These, in my opinion, are the true and secure means by which the enemies of the peace and prosperity of the Philippines may be humbled, their piracies prevented, and a basis laid for the future civilization of the remaining islands in this important Archipelago.  To this sketch, a number of other details and essential illustrations, no doubt, are wanting; and possibly, I may be accused of some inaccuracies, in discussing a topic, with which I candidly avow I cannot be considered altogether familiar.  The plan and success of the enterprise must, however, greatly depend on military skill and talent; but as I have attempted no more than fairly to trace the general outline of the plan, and insist on the necessity of its adoption, my remarks, it is to be hoped, will serve to awaken a serious disposition to review and investigate the whole subject, a task that most assuredly ought to be confided to a competent and special council.  Whatever defects I may involuntarily have fallen into, will then be corrected; at the same time it ought not to appear strange that inexperienced persons should presume to speak on matters connected with the public good, when we see them so much neglected by those whose more immediate duty it is to look after and promote them.  At all events, dispassionate zeal has seldom done harm; and I again repeat, that my wish is not so much to see my own ideas adopted, as to urge the necessity of their being examined and digested.  I am desirous that other sources of information on this subject should be explored, that practical men should be called in, and that those in power should be induced to apply themselves and devote their exertions to an object so highly deserving of their attention.  In short, I am anxious that the pious injunctions of our monarchs should be fulfilled, and that the tears and blood of the inhabitants of these neglected islands should cease to flow.