In case it should be determined to adopt the means proposed by Colonel Tobias, for the purpose of holding the Moros of Mindanao in check, and to which, unfortunately, due regard has not hitherto been paid, notwithstanding the enterprise presents very few difficulties, owing to the little opposition to be expected from the infidel natives, the latter would then be left completely surrounded and shut up in the heart of the island, and their active system of privateering, with which they have so many years infested these seas, entirely destroyed. If, through the want of garrisons and population, it should not, however, be possible to deprive them of all their outlets, by which means they would still be able occasionally to send some of their cruising vessels, nevertheless there would be facilities with which it would be possible to pursue and counteract the ravages of the few pirates who might furtively escape out of some river, while now they are fitted out, and well manned and armed to the number of one and two hundred war-boats, openly in their ports.
[A plan for future policing.] After the emporiums of slavery have been destroyed by the conquest of Jolo, and the other general measures adopted, as above pointed out, the government would then be in a situation to turn its attention, with much greater ease, to the arrangement of all the other minor schemes of precaution and protection suited to the difference of circumstances and locality, without the concurrence of which the work would be left imperfect, and in some degree the existence of those settled in the new establishments rendered precarious. As, however, I am unprepared minutely to point out the nature of these measures, or distinctly to lay down a ground-work for future civilization and improvement, I shall merely observe, that what would then remain to be done would neither require any great capital, or present obstacles which might not easily be overcome. The Moros being then concentrated in the Island of Mindanao, and this completely surrounded on all sides by our forts and settlements, in the manner above described, the only enemies let loose on these seas would be either the few who might, from time to time, elude the vigilance of our troops and district-commanders, or those who might have escaped from Jolo previous to its conquest, and taken up their abode in one or other of the Bisayas Islands; or, in short, such as are out cruising at the time our armament returns to Zamboanga and takes possession of the southern coast of Mindanao; in which case they would be compelled to resort to a roving life, establishing, like the Jolo fugitives, temporary dwellings among the mangroves and thickets bordering on the shore.