My answer was, that his system of moral tests might be as delusive as what ignorant people take to be tests of intellect and learning.  If the scholar or savant cannot answer their haphazard questions on the shortest notice, their belief in his capacity is shaken.  But the better-informed have given up the Johnsonian theory of mind as a pair of legs able to walk east or west according to choice.  Intellect is no longer taken to be a ready-made dose of ability to attain eminence (or mediocrity) in all departments; it is even admitted that application in one line of study or practice has often a laming effect in other directions, and that an intellectual quality or special facility which is a furtherance in one medium of effort is a drag in another.  We have convinced ourselves by this time that a man may be a sage in celestial physics and a poor creature in the purchase of seed-corn, or even in theorising about the affections; that he may be a mere fumbler in physiology and yet show a keen insight into human motives; that he may seem the “poor Poll” of the company in conversation and yet write with some humorous vigour.  It is not true that a man’s intellectual power is like the strength of a timber beam, to be measured by its weakest point.

Why should we any more apply that fallacious standard of what is called consistency to a man’s moral nature, and argue against the existence of fine impulses or habits of feeling in relation to his actions generally, because those better movements are absent in a class of cases which act peculiarly on an irritable form of his egoism?  The mistake might be corrected by our taking notice that the ungenerous words or acts which seem to us the most utterly incompatible with good dispositions in the offender, are those which offend ourselves.  All other persons are able to draw a milder conclusion.  Laniger, who has a temper but no talent for repartee, having been run down in a fierce way by Mordax, is inwardly persuaded that the highly-lauded man is a wolf at heart:  he is much tried by perceiving that his own friends seem to think no worse of the reckless assailant than they did before; and Corvus, who has lately been flattered by some kindness from Mordax, is unmindful enough of Laniger’s feeling to dwell on this instance of good-nature with admiring gratitude.  There is a fable that when the badger had been stung all over by bees, a bear consoled him by a rhapsodic account of how he himself had just breakfasted on their honey.  The badger replied, peevishly, “The stings are in my flesh, and the sweetness is on your muzzle.”  The bear, it is said, was surprised at the badger’s want of altruism.