But the truth is that, if my opponent is unable to defend himself, it gives me the possibility, but not by any means the right, of killing him.  The right, the moral justification, must depend entirely upon the motives which I have for taking his life.  Even supposing that I have sufficient motive for taking a man’s life, there is no reason why I should make his death depend upon whether I can shoot or fence better than he.  In such a case, it is immaterial in what way I kill him, whether I attack him from the front or the rear.  From a moral point of view, the right of the stronger is no more convincing than the right of the more skillful; and it is skill which is employed if you murder a a man treacherously.  Might and skill are in this case equally right; in a duel, for instance, both the one and the other come into play; for a feint is only another name for treachery.  If I consider myself morally justified in taking a man’s life, it is stupid of me to try first of all whether he can shoot or fence better than I; as, if he can, he will not only have wronged me, but have taken my life into the bargain.

It is Rousseau’s opinion that the proper way to avenge an insult is, not to fight a duel with your aggressor, but to assassinate him,—­an opinion, however, which he is cautious enough only to barely indicate in a mysterious note to one of the books of his Emile.  This shows the philosopher so completely under the influence of the mediaeval superstition of knightly honor that he considers it justifiable to murder a man who accuses you of lying:  whilst he must have known that every man, and himself especially, has deserved to have the lie given him times without number.

The prejudice which justifies the killing of your adversary, so long as it is done in an open contest and with equal weapons, obviously looks upon might as really right, and a duel as the interference of God.  The Italian who, in a fit of rage, falls upon his aggressor wherever he finds him, and despatches him without any ceremony, acts, at any rate, consistently and naturally:  he may be cleverer, but he is not worse, than the duelist.  If you say, I am justified in killing my adversary in a duel, because he is at the moment doing his best to kill me; I can reply that it is your challenge which has placed him under the necessity of defending himself; and that by mutually putting it on the ground of self-defence, the combatants are seeking a plausible pretext for committing murder.  I should rather justify the deed by the legal maxim Volenti non fit injuria; because the parties mutually agree to set their life upon the issue.

This argument may, however, be rebutted by showing that the injured party is not injured volens; because it is this tyrannical principle of knightly honor, with its absurd code, which forcibly drags one at least of the combatants before a bloody inquisition.